Prejudice and Protectionism: Essays at the Intersection of International Political Economy and Psychology

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Shahrzad Sabet-Esfahani

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Dissertation Advisor: Jeffry A. Frieden Shahrzad Sabet-Esfahani

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Abstract

What explains public opinion toward economic globalization, and specifically, toward international trade? A wave of recent scholarship has shown that symbolic and identity-based factors—individual predispositions such as ethnocentrism, nationalism, prejudice, and cosmopolitanism—are highly correlated with attitudes toward trade. The nature of the relationship between symbolic attitudes and trade opinion, however, remains conspicuously unclear. This dissertation combines fresh empirical strategies with the theoretical tools of both economics and psychology to illuminate the role and effect of non-material factors in the formation of public opinion toward international trade. I present a new theoretical framework for the study of individual preferences in international political economy, and test the empirical implications of the theory using observational data, an original survey experiment, and systematic analysis of open-ended survey responses. Specifically, I show: (1) that symbolic attitudes such a prejudice have a causal effect on trade preferences, independent of economic considerations; (2) that the effect of economic self-interest on trade preferences is contingent upon the strength of symbolic attitudes; and (3) that the trade preferences of cosmopolitan individuals are susceptible to the effect of subjective beliefs about the impact of trade on foreigners, providing the first evidence of foreign-regarding motivations in the context of trade opinion.

Contents

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Chapter 1

Introduction

What explains public opinion toward economic globalization, and specifically, toward international trade? A wave of recent scholarship has shown that symbolic and identity-based factors—individual predispositions such as ethnocentrism, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and prejudice—are highly correlated with attitudes toward trade (e.g., Dong et al. 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001). This constitutes one of the most important recent developments in the study of mass attitudes in international political economy (IPE), and perhaps in the study of IPE overall. But despite an impressive array of research into the non-material sources of trade preferences, the nature of the relationship between symbolic attitudes and trade opinion remains conspicuously unclear. Indeed, a set of fundamental questions call for answers.

First, do individual-level symbolic attitudes such as prejudice have an independent causal effect on trade preferences? Second, how can the effect of symbolic factors be reconciled with the predictions of conventional, self-interest-based models of preferences in political economy? In other words, if, as studies of survey data suggest, both material and symbolic factors matter, what is relationship between the two in the formation of public opinion toward trade? Finally, is the role of symbolic attitudes in the formation of trade preferences different at opposite ends of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum

(e.g., for "prejudiced"[1] individuals versus "cosmopolitans")? The three central chapters of this dissertation address these key gaps in our understanding of public opinion toward international trade.

Although each chapter is written as a stand-alone paper, all share a common theoretical core: throughout the dissertation, I employ the tools of both psychology and economics to build a coherent theoretical foundation for the study of individual preferences in IPE. Specifically, I draw upon the notion of heuristic judgment from behavioral economics and the theory of symbolic politics from political psychology to argue that trade preferences are primarily the product of emotional rather than cognitive responses. The implications of my theory are then tested in the American context with observational data, an original survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative sample, and the systematic analysis of open-ended survey responses. In sum, this dissertation combines a new theoretical framework with innovative empirical strategies to move the literature in this area from a mostly dichotomous debate over the relative strength of material versus non-material factors to a more nuanced, comprehensive, and theoretically-grounded understanding of voter behavior with respect to globalization.

Chapter 2, "What's in Name? Investigating the Causal Effect of Prejudice on Individual Trade Preferences," addresses the question: Does prejudice have an independent causal effect on public attitudes toward trade? For over a decade, students of public opinion have consistently observed a strong statistical association between symbolic attitudes such as prejudice and nationalism, on the one hand, and opposition to international trade, on the other. But as multiple scholars have correctly pointed out, this correlation—however strong and consistent—does not shed light on the important question of causation. To address this question, I first provide a theoretical foundation for the causal claim that cultural prejudice increases protectionism. Then, to investigate the claim empirically, I employ a creative survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative sample of Americans, manipulating only the name of a hypothetical foreign firm

[1]Throughout this dissertation, the term "prejudiced" is used simply as a label for those who have especially negative attitudes toward out-groups. Clearly, this designation is not intended as an indictment of those individuals' character.

that would be affected by a proposed U.S. trade agreement. I find that among prejudiced Americans, "cultural distance" from trading partners more than doubles the level of opposition to international trade, independent of economic considerations. These results strongly suggest that prejudice causes an increase in protectionism, and that this causal effect is very large.

Chapter 3, "Feelings First: Non-Material Factors as Moderators of Economic Self-Interest Effects on Trade Preferences," reconciles the findings of Chapter 2 with the predictions of conventional, self-interest-based models of public opinion in political economy. While studies have shown that, on average, both economic and symbolic factors affect trade preferences, the micro-foundations of preference formation—the particular role of these two types of factors, and their relationship to one another in that process—have neither been theorized, nor investigated empirically. This chapter takes a substantial step in that direction, illuminating—and ultimately breaking—the "material versus non-material" dichotomy that has come to characterize this area of scholarship.

In this chapter, I advance a theoretical framework grounded in psychology that accounts for *both* material and non-material sources of trade opinion and, importantly, specifies the relationship between the two. I predict that the effect of self-interest is not uniform across individuals, but rather, conditional upon the *strength* (whether positive or negative) of symbolic attitudes—in this case, an individual's attitude toward foreign cultural influences. I test this proposition using data from an original survey of over four thousand American workers. My key finding is strong and striking: industry-based, material self-interest is a "second order" consideration that acquires salience only when symbolic attitudes are weak. Symbolic sources of trade preferences, on the other hand, are primary, "first order" factors that can altogether trump the contribution of economic self-interest to an individual's stance trade. Put differently, non-material factors define the scope conditions for models of trade opinion based on material self-interest.

Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on those with highly positive attitudes toward out-groups, finding that the trade preferences of these "cosmopolitan" individuals are shaped by their beliefs about the effect of trade on foreigners. Subjective beliefs about the impact of

international trade have recently been presented as key sources of individual trade preferences. In particular, beliefs about trade's effect on one's self and family, and more prominently, perceptions of how trade impacts one's country as a whole have been advanced as important sources of public opinion toward trade. Chapter 4 considers the possibility that trade preferences are shaped by subjective beliefs about the impact of trade *beyond* one's borders. I introduce the notion of foreign-regarding considerations into the study of globalization opinion, arguing that perceptions of trade's impact abroad can shape public opinion toward trade at home. Specifically, and as mentioned above, I contend that the trade preferences of cosmopolitans are especially susceptible to the effect of foreign-regarding considerations. To examine these claims empirically, I employ a creative survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative sample of Americans, supplementing the results with an analysis of open-ended responses provided by all the subjects. Taken together, the findings of this chapter provide the first evidence of foreign-regarding motivations in the context of trade preferences. They also show that the role of symbolic attitudes in the formation of trade preferences is not necessarily identical at both ends of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum.

In brief, the chapters that follow advance the contours of scholarship on public opinion in IPE by addressing three central questions in the study of individual preferences over trade. The implications of this research for politics and policy are significant. We operate in a political context where public debates over foreign economic policy are commonly framed in symbolic and emotional terms, and where trade agreements are increasingly negotiated with specific countries and regions—each with cultural, as well as economic, characteristics. In this setting, a clear understanding of the ways in which non-material factors interact with economic considerations to affect public support for global economic integration is essential if one is to effectively navigate all the contours of the globalization debate.

Chapter 2

What's in Name? Investigating the Causal Effect of Prejudice on Individual Trade Preferences

2.1 Introduction

Does prejudice have a causal effect on trade preferences? For over a decade, students of public opinion have consistently observed a strong statistical association between symbolic attitudes such as prejudice and nationalism, on the one hand, and opposition to international trade, on the other (Dong et al. 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001). This constitutes one of the most important recent developments in the study of mass attitudes in international political economy. But as multiple scholars have correctly pointed out, this correlation—however strong and consistent—does not shed light on the important question of causality (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012; Margalit 2012). Despite an impressive array of research into the non-material sources of trade preferences, the nature of the relationship between symbolic attitudes and trade opinion remains conspicuously unclear. This ambiguity represents a fundamental gap in the IPE literature. If prejudice

does not cause protectionist trade sentiment, then the correlation we observe becomes largely irrelevant to explanations of public attitudes toward trade. Addressing the causal question is thus of central importance

Causal inference in this context is not easy. Observational studies are especially challenged in isolating the independent effect of prejudice on protectionism, and the use of randomized experiments toward this end has been very limited. This chapter employs a creative experimental design to overcome this inferential problem. I take inspiration from Bertrand and Mullainathan's famous resume experiment (2004)—where names on identical resumes are manipulated to identify the presence of racial discrimination in the U.S. labor market—and investigate the effect of "cultural distance" from trading partners on individual trade preferences. The survey experiment, fielded on a nationally representative sample of Americans, cleanly isolates the effect of cultural distance by manipulating only the name of a hypothetical foreign firm that would be affected by a potential U.S. trade measure. I find that among prejudiced Americans, cultural distance from trading partners more than doubles the level of opposition to international trade. This result strongly suggests that the causal effect of symbolic attitudes on trade opinion is both real and strong: prejudice greatly increases protectionism.

The implications of this finding are significant. Not only does it shed light on a particularly fundamental question in the IPE literature, but it also highlights the potential impact of prejudice on the politics of trade and on the contours of international trade policy more broadly.

The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. I begin by presenting theoretical foundations for the causal claim, building upon the notion of heuristic judgment from behavioral economics and the theory of symbolic politics from political psychology. Next, Section 2.3 reviews obstacles to causal inference in observational studies of public opinion and examines the limits of past experimental research into the effect of symbolic attitudes on trade preferences. In Section 2.4, I thoroughly describe the experimental design of this study. Section 2.5 presents the results of the experiment, while Section 2.6 considers the robustness of these findings. Section 2.7 concludes.

2.2 Prejudice and Protectionism: Situating the Relationship

2.2.1 Evidence of Strong Correlation

There is mounting evidence that symbolic attitudes[1] of various kinds—prejudice, ethnocentrism, nationalistic chauvinism—are strongly associated with opposition to international trade. For example, Sinnott and O'Rourke (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) analyze the same cross-national survey data to find that various measures of nationalist sentiment are strongly correlated with protectionist trade preferences. Likewise, Rankin (2001) argues that nationalistic attachment is a key factor in explaining mass attitudes toward trade. Focusing on the United States, Rankin finds that attachment to what he calls "patriotic," "sovereign," and "cultural" conceptions of national identity are all highly correlated with protectionism.

To capture symbolic attitudes, Mansfield and Mutz's 2009 study of American trade opinion relies primarily on ethnocentrism scales designed to measure "the commonplace inclination to divide the world into ingroups and outgroups, the former characterized by virtuosity and talent, the latter by corruption and mediocrity" (Kam and Kinder 2007, p. 321). As Mansfield and Mutz explain, ethnocentrism taps "prejudice, broadly conceived" (p. 440). Once again in this study, the association between symbolic attitudes—in this case, ethnocentrism—and trade protectionism is strong. More recently, Dong et al. (2013) replicate this finding using a sample of Chinese citizens. And in yet another example, Chapter 3 of this dissertation finds that in a survey of over 4,000 U.S. workers, sentiment toward foreign cultures powerfully predicts individual trade opinion.

2.2.2 Theoretical Foundations for the Causal Claim: Affective Judgment and Symbolic Politics

These observational studies consistently reveal one finding: symbolic predispositions such as prejudice are strongly associated with protectionist attitudes toward international

[1]The terms "symbolic attitudes" and "symbolic predispositions" are also used interchangeably in this chapter.

trade. While the theoretical basis of this finding is left unexplored and underdeveloped in many studies, political psychology offers a compelling and theoretically grounded explanation for this consistent result (Rankin 2001). Indeed, theories of heuristic judgment and symbolic politics from psychology expect this association to not only be strong, but also to be causal: prejudice should increase protectionism.

Consider first that rationality, as a cognitive process, can be very demanding. As research in social psychology indicates, the mind relies on shortcuts wherever possible to avoid the effortful mental work of conscious and deliberate reasoning. This idea is famously articulated by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who argued in their Nobel prize-winning work that individuals use "heuristics"[2] to simplify complex decisions into quick, intuitive judgments (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Such heuristics are not consciously chosen. Rather, they are part of a "mental shotgun" whereby the mind instinctively evades the demanding work of complex reasoning by substituting an easier question for a difficult one—typically without noticing the substitution (Kahneman 2011).

One of the most commonly used intuitive heuristics in decision making involves reliance on emotion or *affect* (Kahneman 2011; Sears 2001).[3] The notion of affective judgment was introduced into the heuristics lexicon by psychologist Paul Slovic as an *affect heuristic* (Slovic et al. 2002). Building on the work of Kahneman and Tversky, Slovic observed a process of decision making in which judgments are guided directly by reflexive gut feelings of liking and disliking, without deliberation or reasoning. The affect heuristic, in other words, is an instance of substitution where the answer to an easy question (How do I *feel* about it?) serves subconsciously as an answer to a much harder question (What do I *think* about it?).

The world of politics is not immune to the shortcuts of the human mind. In the realm of political preference formation, the notion of judgment through affective response finds prominent expression in the theory of symbolic politics. According to this theory, people acquire early in life a set of broad and highly stable "symbolic" predispositions (e.g.,

[2]The technical definition of heuristic is "a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions" (Kahneman 2011).

[3]I follow Neuman et al. (2007) and use the terms "emotion" and "affect" interchangeably.

prejudice, nationalism, political ideology) which drives their attitudes toward particular political issues in adulthood (Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 1980). Importantly, symbolic predispositions drive political preferences by way of the affective shortcuts discussed above. Later in life, as an individual is confronted with new and unfamiliar policy issues, the symbols posed by those issues evoke habitual and highly affective responses based on the person's longstanding symbolic attitudes. As Sears et al. explained when they introduced the theory in the late 1970s, the political symbols posed by issues such as "integration" and "affirmative action," for example, evoke habitual and emotional responses based on underlying predispositions such as racial tolerance or prejudice (1979). More recently, it has been shown that racial attitudes are an important driver of public opinion toward health care reform policy in the United States (Tesler 2012). The policy—widely known as "Obamacare"—is closely associated with an African American President, and thus, as a policy issue, it evokes an automatic gut reaction rooted in attitudes toward race.

The theory of symbolic politics therefore implies a distinctive mode of information processing which proceeds by way of strong affective responses to political symbols. In the arena of mass politics, then, strong symbolic predispositions make possible the cognitive shortcut of judgment via affect: when the relevant predispositions are sufficiently strong, the gut feelings evoked by political issues direct preferences, making a demanding cognitive process unnecessary.

My claim is that individual judgments about international trade are no exception. The theory of symbolic politics suggests that the symbols associated with trade—it represents a transaction with a "foreign other," for instance—evoke an affective response based on stable symbolic predispositions such as generalized prejudice, nationalism, or aversion toward out-groups. To put it in the language of heuristics, the difficult and complex question—"What do I think about trade?"—is displaced by the much easier question: "How do I feel about it?" The resulting hypothesis is clear: individual preferences over trade will be directly affected by individual-level predispositions such as prejudice. Put differently, prejudice should have an independent effect on mass attitudes toward inter-

national trade.

As already demonstrated, evidence of a strong, positive relationship between prejudice and protectionism is plentiful. Empirically identifying the causal nature of this relationship, however, presents challenges that are difficult to overcome in observational studies. I now turn to this inferential problem.

2.3 Prejudice, Protectionism, and Causal Inference: The Limits of What We Know

2.3.1 Obstacles to Causal Inference in Observational Studies of Trade Preferences

The studies referenced in Section 2.1 make a significant contribution to our understanding of mass attitudes toward trade by suggesting that trade preferences might be influenced by non-economic, symbolic attitudes. As skeptics of the "non-material" interpretation of trade preferences correctly point out, however, the meaning of a strong relationship between one attitude and another is essentially ambiguous (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012). The causal priority of prejudice, in other words, is far from obvious in this context.

It is possible, for instance, that a causal link between non-material sentiment and trade opinion *does* exist, but that causality runs in the reverse direction. It might be that, in fact, opposition to free trade or a generally negative posture toward global economic integration results in contempt toward out-groups and foreignness. International trade is, after all, an interaction with some foreign "other." That strong opposition to trade could color one's broader outlook on "otherness" is not implausible.

It is also possible that the strong relationship we observe between symbolic attitudes and trade opinion is a spurious one: some *other* factor might be causing both. For example, it could be that an individual's attitudes toward trade and outgroups are both the result of her association with some group or doctrine. Fordham and Kleinberg illustrate this point nicely:

> Groups adopt common positions on many issues. Some common attitudes are logically unrelated but are nevertheless consistent within the group. For

> example, members of a particular occupation might dress or speak in a similar way to show their solidarity—or simply to blend in—even if nothing about their job requires them to do so. Even though one would certainly find a strong statistical relationship between these modes of dress and speech and the attitudes typical of the group, this relationship is not causal... The same problem of causal inference applies to associations between logically unrelated attitudes on less trivial matters. A group might be especially patriotic, ethnocentric, or isolationist, but there is not necessarily a causal relationship between these attitudes and the group's typical position on trade (2012, p. 323).

Needless to say, the "third" factor driving both prejudice and protectionism may very well be some underlying economic interest. Trade competition with an ethnically distant nation could lead to both anti-trade sentiment *and* prejudice or chauvinistic nationalism.

It is thus far from clear that the statistical association we observe between prejudice and trade opinion is evidence that symbolic attitudes enjoy causal priority in connection to protectionism. The claim that prejudice has a causal effect on trade preferences—and especially, that this effect is independent of economic interests—calls for the design of research that can specifically test the causal nature of the relationship. This is a crucially important task in the study of globalization opinion. As Margalit explains, "[If] non-economic sentiments are not the cause of support for trade protectionism, then the correlation [that] scholars find is irrelevant for explaining the sources of popular opposition to trade openness" (Margalit 2012, p. 484).

2.3.2 Past Experimental Study of Symbolic Predispositions and Trade Opinion

Despite the obstacles to causal inference in observational studies, the use of randomized experiments to detect the effect of symbolic predispositions on trade attitudes has been extremely limited. The only experimental study of which I am aware was carried out by Margalit (2012).[4] His survey experiment was fielded on a sample of 1,455 American respondents who were randomly assigned to either a control or one of two treatment groups. The first treatment group was exposed to a "cultural" prime; the second to a

[4]Mansfield and Mutz (forthcoming) present the results of a survey experiment designed to test the relationship between symbolic attitudes and preferences over another dimension of globalization, namely, outsourcing.

"libertarian" prime. The cultural prime treatment consisted of a set of questions about social and cultural issues which relate to changes in the traditional American way of life—whether the U.S. national anthem should be sung in languages other than English, and whether homosexual couples should be allowed to legally marry. In contrast, individuals in the control group were exposed to questions about their preferences over outdoor activities. All respondents were then asked: "Do you think that growing trade and business ties of the United States with other countries have made the average American better or worse off?"

Margalit's results show that respondents exposed to the cultural prime express more negative views of the impact of economic integration than either those in the control group or in the libertarian treatment group—but this treatment effect is only observed among the less-educated. Margalit takes this finding to suggest both that cultural concerns do indeed have a causal effect on trade opinion, and that the less-educated are "more likely to associate economic integration with a set of social and cultural consequences that they view as harmful" (2012, p. 495). The latter conclusion is attributed by the author to the fact that educational attainment is negatively correlated with factors such as prejudice, intolerance of other cultures, and feelings of in-group superiority.

While this study is path-breaking in many respects, it is also susceptible to a number of critiques, especially as an investigation into the independent causal effect of symbolic attitudes. More generally, the experimental investigation of any challenging research question benefits from refinement through the development and implementation of diverse designs. In this study, I build upon Margalit's important contribution, benefiting from the strengths of his experimental design while trying to address its weaknesses.

First, for the purposes of distinguishing the effect of cultural concerns from economic ones, Margalit's experimental manipulation is somewhat limited. In line with the general argument of his paper (the survey experiment is only one part of a broader study), the cultural treatment is meant to prime a sense of "cultural threat" by reminding respondents of potentially imminent changes to the traditional American way of life. But it is quite plausible that this particular manipulation (if indeed, it is successful) triggers a feeling of

generalized threat to one's "way of life"—a feeling that might subsume or easily spillover to other, namely economic, aspects of life. In other words, by specifically highlighting impending threats to a way of life rather than employing a more subtle prime of underlying symbolic predispositions, the study is less likely to preclude from the subject's judgment considerations of *economic* loss or threat.

Given the nature of Margalit's argument, this issue might not be problematic for his study. He argues, after all, that global economic integration is generally perceived as an "openness package," the "broad and complex effects" of which are difficult for individuals to disentangle and separately assess (2012, p. 486). To specifically isolate the effect of prejudice, however, an experimental manipulation that subtly primes prejudice while keeping economic factors constant is far more suitable.

Toward this end, the experimental design and robustness checks I present below explicitly control for other variables that might explain the correlation between cultural concerns and negative trade opinion. Specifically, the economic, political, and safety-related implications of trade are specified and held constant. I can therefore be confident that any treatment effect observed in my study is due to cultural factors and not the result of assumptions made by respondents about other aspects of trade.

In order to distinguish those who received the treatment from those who did not, my study also includes a post-treatment manipulation check. Unfortunately, without such a check in Margalit's design, we cannot know whether his cultural prime was in fact successful in encouraging heightened cultural concern. This is especially problematic since the effect of his cultural treatment depends on low educational attainment. As Margalit himself points out, it "may be that the effect of the prime on individuals with lower education was stronger not because of their cultural sensitivities, but simply because they are more susceptible to priming" (p. 495).

Finally, the use of education as a proxy for prejudice or "cultural sensitivity" is less than ideal. Margalit suggests that a cultural treatment effect is observed only among the less-educated because these individuals are more likely to be prejudiced, ethnocentric, nationalist, and so on. But if, theoretically speaking, the relevant characteristic is

prejudice or nationalism, then conditioning the analysis on a more direct measure of that symbolic predisposition would offer a much more revealing and direct test of the underlying argument. I overcome this limitation by including in my survey a direct measure of individual prejudice.

2.4 Experimental Design

2.4.1 Overview

To investigate the effect prejudice on trade preferences, I designed a population-based survey experiment (Mutz 2011) that builds upon the studies discussed in the preceding section. The experiment was fielded on a sample of 1,001 Americans from July 13 to July 16, 2013. The GfK Group conducted the survey using the web-enabled KnowledgePanel, a probability-based panel designed to be representative of the U.S. population. Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in the KnowledgePanel. For those who agree to participate, but do not already have internet access, GfK provides at no cost a laptop and ISP connection. People who already have computers and internet service are permitted to participate using their own equipment.

The experiment employs a creative design to resolve the inferential problem described in Section 2.3. I take inspiration from Bertrand and Mullainathan's famous resume experiment (2004), where names on identical resumes are manipulated to identify racial discrimination in the U.S. labor market, to investigate the effect of "cultural distance" from trading partners on individual trade preferences. All subjects were informed of a potential policy measure that would ease U.S. trade restrictions and make it easier for some foreign firms to sell their products in the United States. Subjects were then presented with the hypothetical example of one company that would be affected by such a trade measure (i.e., a foreign company for whom it would become easier to export goods into the U.S. as a result of the trade policy under consideration). Finally, respondents

were asked to report their level of support for the potential trade measure.

The key experimental manipulation of the study concerns the *name* of the hypothetical foreign firm that was presented to respondents. Subjects were assigned to a firm name that was shown (through prior experimental investigation—see below) to sound either culturally familiar or ambiguously foreign. A second manipulation involved the economic characteristics of the hypothetical firm, specifically, whether the skill level of the company's labor input is high or low. In all treatment conditions, respondents were explicitly informed that the hypothetical foreign firm is from a country that poses no political or security threats to the United States, and that the company respects safety and labor standards. Furthermore, and as mentioned previously, I collect data on respondents' levels of prejudice, enabling me to test directly the proposition that the effect of the "culturally foreign" treatment is contingent on a high degree of individual prejudice.

By keeping constant the economic characteristics of the firm, as well as the political relationship of the United States with the firm's country of origin, this strategy makes it possible to cleanly isolate the causal effect of cultural distance from trading partners on individual trade preferences. If exposure to the culturally distant firm name increases protectionism, and if this effect, in turn, is contingent upon high levels of individual prejudice, then we can infer that generalized prejudice in the form of aversion to outgroups and foreignness is driving the increased opposition to trade. In other words, this design makes it possible to directly investigate for the first time whether cultural prejudice is causally prior to trade preferences, independent of other considerations.

2.4.2 Culturally Familiar versus Ambiguously Foreign: The Choice of Firm Names

Clearly, the choice of a culturally foreign and a culturally familiar firm name is crucial to the success of this study and to the credibility of its findings. Most importantly, in order to avoid the possibility that the results are driven by the cultural, economic, or political characteristics of any one country or part of the world, it is essential that the name used to signal cultural distance is ambiguously foreign. That is to say, the chosen name should not be easily or overwhelmingly associated by subjects with a single country or cluster of

countries. Rather, what is needed is a name whose believed origin enjoys a relatively even distribution across a reasonably broad range of culturally distant countries and regions.

Given this criterion, I tested the suitability of numerous invented and quasi-invented names through a series of surveys on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Respondents on MTurk were asked: "[*Firm Name*] is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part of the world would you say that [*Firm Name*] is from? Please be as specific as possible and remember that the most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind." Based on responses to this question, I finally identified the name "Tuntyakore & Zideying" as an ideal candidate. The preceding question was also posed at the outset of this survey to those in the culturally foreign treatment group of the nationally representative sample. Their answers—classified according to the standard United Nations Geographical Region Groupings[5] and represented in Figure 2.1—confirm the suitability of "Tuntyakore & Zideying" as an ambiguously foreign firm name.

As a company name that signals cultural proximity, I chose "Gordon & Roberts." MTurk respondents identified this name primarily with the United Kingdom, but "Gordon & Roberts" was also strongly associated with Canada and a number of other Western European countries. The responses of those in the culturally familiar treatment group of the nationally representative sample, again offered at the outset of this survey and represented in Figure 2.2, largely reflect the MTurk findings.

Needless to say, this study relies heavily on the assumption that cultural distance is binary in the context of trade preference formation. While this assumption is unlikely to be accurate, it is both reasonable and highly useful: it enables us to directly address a central—and as yet unresolved—research question in the study of globalization.

[5]See United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

Figure 2.1: Tuntyakore & Zideying's Believed Country of Origin.



Note: Figure 2.1 categorizes and presents answers given by respondents to the following question: "Tuntyakore & Zideying is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part of the world would you say that Tuntyakore & Zideying is from? Please be as specific as possible and remember that the most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind." I classified countries and geographic areas according to the standard United Nations Geographical Region Groupings, with three exceptions. First, I collapse the sub-regions identified by the UN classification as Northern, Western, and Southern Europe into the one category commonly known as "Western Europe." Second, because about 50% of the respondents who identified Tuntyakore & Zideying as being from the African continent did so by simply identifying the continent as a whole (i.e., "Africa"), I collapse the UN's African sub-regions into one category. Note that among the remaining 50% of responses that identified the name as African, but did so more specifically by identifying a particular country or sub-region of the continent, no particular area of Africa was overrepresented. In other words, all areas of the continent were represented relatively evenly. Third, I include an additional category called "Asia" to represent the small minority who responded to the question by simply answering "Asia" and not specifying any particular country or region within that continent.

Figure 2.2: Gordon & Roberts' Believed Country of Origin.



Note: Figure 2.2 categorizes and presents answers given by respondents to the following question: "Gordon & Roberts is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part of the world would you say that Gordon & Roberts is from? Please be as specific as possible and remember that the most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind."

2.4.3 Stimulus and Manipulation Check

A explained above, respondents were exposed to information about the hypothetical foreign firm. Specifically, they were presented with the following information and question:

> Now consider that the United States is contemplating the removal of trade restrictions which would allow some foreign companies to more freely sell their goods in the United States. As a hypothetical example, consider the case of [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*], one such foreign firm. [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] has the following characteristics:
>
> It has about 500 workers.
>
> [*Over 90% of its workers are not college educated, and approximately 60% have not completed high school./Approximately 60% of its workforce has a PhD or other advanced degree, and over 90% of its workforce is university educated.*]

> The company respects safety and labor standards, and is based in a country that poses no political or security threats to the United States.
>
> Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow firms such as [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] to more freely sell their goods in the United States?

Response options spanned a five-point scale ranging from "Strongly support" to "Strongly oppose." The two manipulations yield a 2x2 design with four treatment conditions. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of these four groups.

As explained in Section 2.4.2, respondents were asked to guess the geographic origin of Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts in the survey's opening question. The next question on the survey (still before exposure to the firm-related information and question above) was designed to strengthen the effectiveness[6] of the treatment by asking subjects: "Think for a few moments about the country or part of the world that [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] is from. What language or languages are spoken there? If you're not sure, don't worry—just take a guess." The purpose of this second question is simply to fix in the respondent's mind her original guess, reducing the likelihood that she would change her mind about the firm's country of origin (and potentially, its cultural familiarity or foreignness) upon learning of the firm's other characteristics.

To monitor the latter possibility, I included the following post-treatment manipulation check after measuring the dependent variable: "Did you continue to assume that [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] is from [*respondent's original answer*]?" Those who answered "no" were asked where they assumed Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts to be from. Over 80% of respondents maintained their original answer. Those who changed their mind did not do so in a way that significantly altered the original distribution of guesses across different regions of the world. As a result, the changed answers do not lead to a noticeable shift away from the effectiveness of the experimental

[6] I use the term "effective" here to mean that the treatment is effective in producing the intended variation in the *independent* variable, not that it is effective in altering the *dependent* variable. The latter kind of effectiveness, of course, depends on whether my theory is correct and will be examined in Section 2.5 (Mutz 2011, Chapter 6).

manipulation.[7]

2.4.4 Measuring Prejudice and Protectionism

If cultural distance or foreignness has a causal effect on trade preferences, we should observe greater opposition to the hypothetical easing of trade restrictions among those exposed to the culturally foreign firm name, Tuntyakore & Zideying, versus those exposed to the culturally familiar firm name, Gordon & Roberts. In line with the hypothesis derived from the theory I advance in Section 2.2, however, the effect of this manipulation should be moderated by the level of individual prejudice. Among the prejudiced, in other words, the perceived cultural foreignness of Tuntyakore & Zideying should trigger an automatic, emotional judgment *against* trade liberalization.

Measuring individual levels prejudice is thus of central importance in this study. To do so, I use an abridged Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) index. SDO scales, used by psychologists to measure racial and ethnic prejudice, offer a number of significant advantages which have not yet been exploited in the study of symbolic attitudes and trade preferences.

The concept of SDO comes from Social Dominance Theory, a social psychological theory based on the idea that "all human societies tend to be structured systems of group-based hierarchies" consisting of "one or a small number of dominant and hegemonic groups at the top and one or a number of subordinate groups at the bottom" (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p. 31). From this theory emerged the individual-level variable called *social dominance orientation*, "the extent to which one desires that one's in-group dominate or be superior to out-groups" (Pratto et al. 1994). As Pratto et al. explain, "We consider SDO to be a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along a superior-inferior dimension" (Pratto et al. 1994, p. 741).

SDO is very strongly and consistently correlated with both racism and nationalism (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Importantly, these correlations hold even when rather differ-

[7]Further details are presented in Figures 1A and 2A of Appendix A.

ent measures of racism and nationalism are used. This reflects one of the great strengths of SDO as a measure of symbolic predispositions in this context, namely, that it has been shown to capture the *underlying* predisposition (i.e., a generalized preference for group dominance) that drives more specific, and often culturally-contingent, symbolic attitudes (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius et al. 1992). In other words, though I label it "prejudice" in this chapter, SDO in fact taps the fundamental predisposition underlying all the symbolic attitudes which have been found to correlate with protectionism in various observational studies of trade preferences. In sum, SDO offers what is likely to be the most basic, generalizable—and thus appropriate—measure of relevant symbolic predispositions in the context of globalization opinion.

The latter point is also important for the eventual extension of this study and others like it to contexts beyond the United States. As a measure of out-group aversion that is not specific to any particular content or culture, SDO can serve as a consistent measure of symbolic predispositions across cultures, countries, and contexts. Indeed, a recent study of SDO in 15 languages and 20 countries shows that the measure is highly general and cross-culturally robust (Pratto et al. 2012). The lion's share of scholarship on mass attitudes toward international trade and globalization focuses on the United States, and studies that rigorously examine the impact of symbolic predispositions on trade preferences outside the American context are especially scarce. The use of a generalizable measure such as SDO can help facilitate greater cross-cultural research in this area.

In this study, I use a two-item SDO scale. After administering the treatment, measuring the dependent variable, checking the manipulation, and collecting additional demographic information, I asked respondents to express their degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements:

"In setting priorities, we must consider all groups."
"We should not push for group equality."

Response options spanned a five-point scale, ranging from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree." To construct a measure of SDO, I first code responses to each of these two statements so that in each case, those favoring (opposing) group inequality have higher

(lower) scores on a five-point scale. I then average the two scores, yielding a five-point SDO variable. In the analysis that follows, those with an SDO score of "4" or "5" are considered "prejudiced". Clearly, this designation is not intended to be a judgment of their character; it is simply a label identifying those who have especially negative attitudes toward out-groups.

Finally, recall from Section 2.4.3 that the dependent variable in this study (i.e., protectionist trade sentiment) is derived from responses to the following question:

> Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow firms such as [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] to more freely sell their goods in the United States?

Figure 2.3 outlines the experimental design and maps the order in which respondents were exposed to the relevant stimuli and questions.[8]

Figure 2.3: Map of Experimental Procedure.



2.5 Results

Table 2.1[9] summarizes the estimated effect of a trading partner's cultural foreignness on protectionism. The left column presents the results from the analysis of all respondents,

[8]To address concerns that the treatment might somehow prime out-group attitudes, a series of unrelated demographic and knowledge questions precede the measurement of symbolic attitudes in this experiment.

[9]The quantitative data used in this dissertation have been deposited at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/25850

while the right column presents the results for prejudiced respondents only.[10]

Table 2.1: The Estimated Effect of Cultural Distance on Protectionism.

	All Respondents	Prejudiced Respondents
Culturally Foreign	24.5	40.4
Culturally Familiar	24.4	22.1
Difference	0.099	18.3*
(95% Confidence Interval)	(-5.3 to 5.5)	(4.3 to 32.5)
p-value	0.971	0.011

Note: The table presents the percentage of respondents who opposed easing trade restrictions when the affected non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign and when it was culturally familiar. The difference is the estimated effect of cultural distance, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. An asterisk indicates an effect that is statistically significant at conventional levels. The sample sizes for the analysis of all respondents were 493 for "Culturally Foreign" and 495 for "Culturally Familiar." The corresponding sample sizes for prejudiced respondents were 89 and 77.

The table shows the percentage of respondents who opposed easing trade restrictions when the affected (hypothetical) non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign and when it was culturally familiar. While the level of trade opposition is virtually identical across treatment groups in the general population, as predicted, cultural foreignness has a significant effect on protectionism among the prejudiced. Approximately 22.1% of highly prejudiced respondents opposed the easing of trade restrictions when the foreign firm was culturally familiar, versus 40.4% when the hypothetical firm was culturally foreign. Cultural distance thus nearly doubled opposition to trade in this subgroup, increasing it by more than 18 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval of 4.3 to 32.5. Clearly, this effect is highly significant both statistically and substantively. The observed interaction between prejudice and the cultural distance treatment provides strong evidence of the independent causal effect of prejudice on protectionism. A visual summary of this result is presented in Figure 2.4.

The manipulation check discussed in Section 2.4.3 confirms that the final distributions

[10]Since my primary concern here is assessing the effect of cultural distance, I pool over both economic treatment conditions in the analysis that follows. Conditioning the results on the skill level of the hypothetical firm's labor input, however, yields results that are substantively similar.

Figure 2.4: Experimental Treatment, Prejudice, and Protectionist Trade Preferences.



of respondent beliefs about the origins of the two hypothetical firms are highly similar across the general sample and the prejudiced subset.[11] It is not the case, in other words, that more highly prejudiced respondents were more likely to successfully receive the treatment. The conditional treatment effect I report, therefore, is due to prejudice—it is not due to differences in manipulation susceptibility across the two groups.

Relatedly, the effect of cultural distance should become amplified if we focus more narrowly on those respondents who *were* identified (via the manipulation check) as having received the treatment. I repeat the analysis presented above, but this time, I include only those respondents who believed that Tuntyakore & Zideying (Gordon & Roberts) is from a culturally foreign (familiar) country or part of the world. In the case of the culturally foreign treatment group, I dropped from the analysis all those who associated Tuntyakore & Zideying with North America, Western Europe, Australia, or New Zealand. Conversely, in the case of the culturally familiar treatment, I dropped respondents who associated Gordon & Roberts with anywhere but Western Europe (including the United

[11]For details, see Figures 1A and 2A in Appendix A.

Kingdom), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. I also excluded any respondent who refused to answer the question about firm origin, or who answered the question by saying that he either did not know or did not care. In total, 383 of the original 988 respondents were dropped from the analysis of the general sample, while 70 of the original 166 subjects were dropped from the prejudiced subgroup.

Table 2.2 summarizes the results of this analysis. Once again, I present the percentage of respondents who opposed easing trade restrictions in each treatment group.

Table 2.2: The Estimated Effect of Cultural Distance on Protectionism, Treatment Received.

	Treatment Received	
	All Respondents	Prejudiced Respondents
Culturally Foreign	25.6	44.4
Culturally Familiar	20.0	19.0
Difference	5.6	25.4*
(95% Confidence Interval)	(-1.1 to 12.4)	(6.6 to 44.1)
p-value	0.101	0.009

Note: The table presents the percentage of respondents who opposed easing trade restrictions when the affected non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign and when it was culturally familiar. The difference is the estimated effect of cultural distance, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. An asterisk indicates an effect that is statistically significant at conventional levels. The sample sizes for the analysis of all respondents were 320 for "Culturally Foreign" and 285 for "Culturally Familiar." The corresponding sample sizes for prejudiced respondents were 54 and 42.

Both in the general sample and in the prejudiced subgroup, the magnitude of the foreignness effect increases when I include only those who received the treatment: from 0.099 to 5.6 percentage points in the case of the former, and from 18.3 to 44.4 percentage points in the case of the latter. In this second analysis, in other words, cultural distance more than doubles the level of protectionism among the prejudiced. The effect remains highly significant statistically in this subgroup, but once again, does not attain conventional levels of statistical significance in the general population.[12]

[12]Readers might observe the implication of these results for the non-prejudiced: among that subgroup, cultural distance decreases opposition to trade. Indeed, when only those who received the treatment

2.6 Robustness Checks

Readers might wonder whether the results of this study are sensitive to the wording of its key survey instrument. Recall that after exposing subjects to the characteristics of the hypothetical firm, I ask each respondent whether she would support or oppose removing trade restriction which would allow firms "such as" either Tuntyakore & Zideying or Gordon & Roberts to more freely sell their goods in the United States. Because it does not explicitly specify that *all* firms affected by the potential trade policy share the economic characteristics of Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts, the particular wording of this question may lead different subjects to understand the economic implications of the proposed policy differently. Specifically, respondents might assume that other firms affected by the potential trade policy have economic characteristics (i.e., a low- or highly skilled workforce) that are more consistent with the overall workforce characteristics of the hypothetical firm's country of origin. In other words, one might worry that the wording of the survey does not entirely rule out the possibility that the observed increase in protectionism is driven by the assumed economic characteristics of Tuntykore & Zideying's home country, rather than by its cultural distance.

That the effect of cultural distance is conditional on prejudice makes it especially unlikely that economic considerations are driving the results. Still, to address this concern, I re-run the experiment on Mechanical Turk—first using the original version of the question, and then employing two alternative wordings presented in Table 2.3. The alternate versions explicitly preclude unintended economic interpretations of the treatment by specifying (I) that all affected firms share the workforce characteristics of the hypothetical firm, or (II) by removing the phrase "such as" from the question altogether.[13]

are included, cultural distance decreases protectionism by 4% among the non-prejudiced, although this decrease is not close to attaining statistical significance at conventional levels ($p = 0.846$). When the manipulation check is not used to narrow the sample, cultural distance leads to a 15% fall in opposition to trade ($p = 0.191$). See Chapter 4 for an investigation of this phenomenon.

[13]Some readers might suggest that the aims of this robustness check could have been better achieved by telling subjects explicitly that the net economic effect of the proposed trade policy is zero. However, such a condition—under which all respondents assume *no* economic impact—would trivialize the observed effect of cultural distance. What I am seeking to show is more significant—i.e., that cultural distance has an effect when economic considerations are present, not that cultural factors matter when economic

Table 2.3: Alternate Wordings of the Survey, Fielded on Mechanical Turk.

Alternate Version I	"Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow firms such as [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] to more freely sell their goods in the United States? (Note that all firms affected by such a policy would be highly similar to [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] in terms of their workforce characteristics.)"
Alternate Version II	"Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] to more freely sell its goods in the United States?"

All three versions of the survey fielded on MTurk yield consistent results, ruling out the unlikely possibility that the results of this experiment are driven by the assumed economic characteristics of the hypothetical firm's home country. Indeed, in Alternate Version II, cultural distance leads to a 146% increase in protectionism among the prejudiced.

The results reported in Section 2.5 are also robust to the exclusion of respondents whose beliefs about the country origin of Tuntyakore & Zideying cluster around any one geographic sub-region. In other words, the results are not driven by respondents who identify the firm with any single part of the world. Readers might worry, for instance, that the opposition to trade we observe among the prejudiced might dissipate if those who associate the firm with East or South Asia are dropped from the analysis. This is not the case. The results remain virtually unchanged when any one sub-region is excluded. Furthermore, the results are not sensitive to the exclusion of all respondents who believe Tuntyakore & Zideying to be from one of *either* China or India.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the first evidence of the independent causal effect of cultural distance on trade preferences. I have argued from a theoretical perspective grounded in

consequences are completely absent.

psychology that prejudice causes opposition to international trade, leading to the specific prediction that cultural distance from trading partners will increase protectionism among the highly prejudiced. I then tested this proposition using a creative survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative sample of Americans. The results are striking: among the prejudiced, cultural distance more than doubles opposition to international trade. This findings provides strong support for the causal priority of symbolic predispositions in the formation of individual trade preferences.

The implications of this finding are substantial. Establishing the causal effect of prejudice on trade opinion not only resolves a particularly fundamental question in the study of IPE, but it also advances the research agenda on the politics of trade more generally. For example, my study sheds considerable light on the often puzzling *public* politics of international trade. Economists have expressed surprise and dismay over the political presentation of globalization in emotionally charged and logically irrelevant terms (Krugman 1996; Mankiw and Swagel 2006). Indeed, a significant proportion of public communications about economic globalization—including *pro*-globalization messages—are designed to activate symbolic predispositions such as prejudice and nationalism (Skonieczky 2001; Luntz 2006; Mullainathan et al. 2008). But if symbolic predispositions are strong drivers of mass attitudes in this area, then the economically irrelevant frames employed by political elites become expected rather than surprising.

In a context where trade agreements are increasingly made with specific countries or regions, the causal effect of cultural distance on trade opinion has further important implications for politics and policy. Scholarship on trade opinion is overwhelmingly concerned with preferences over trade *in general*, but polling data indicates that, in the United States at least, the public's support for trade varies substantially across trading partners (Kohut et al. 2010). The findings of this chapter strongly suggest that this variation is due to partners' degree of cultural foreignness, not just their economic characteristics. Support for the causal role of symbolic predispositions leaves students of globalization much better equipped to investigate these underexplored contours of trade politics, as well as their implications for policy.

More generally, the success of this experimental design highlights the possibility of its fruitful application to other issue-areas, including, but not limited to, other dimensions of economic globalization. As research increasingly shows, international trade is not the only global issue that provokes an affective response based on longstanding symbolic predispositions such prejudice, nationalism, or attitudes toward foreignness (Baker and Fitzgerald 2012; Kinder and Kam 2009; Mansfield and Mutz forthcoming). The type of experimental manipulation I use in this study can likely be employed with great success to investigate the effect of symbolic factors on voter attitudes in other policy domains.

Importantly, the design of this study has made it possible to cleanly isolate the effect of cultural factors from that of material self-interest or other economic considerations, implying a strong and independent effect for symbolic predispositions. Critics may counter that even this study cannot rule out the possibility that economic interests are ultimately responsible for the impact of symbolic attitudes on trade opinion: if prejudice is inherited from parents or formed early in life, and if one's family has benefited economically from international trade, then the views expressed at home may very well be more favorable to out-groups and those with whom we trade (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012). It might be argued that, in this way, the independence of prejudiced-based judgments from economic interests remains questionable.

Admittedly, my study does not address the origins of prejudice and thus, cannot imply absolute independence for its effect. But we must take care not to set the bar unreasonably (or even unattainably) high, dismissing in the process truly significant gains in our understanding of public opinion toward globalization. As Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin wrote of the independent effect of international institutions years ago, "Institutions are important 'independently' only in the ordinary sense used in social science: controlling for the effects of power and interests, it matters whether they exist" (Keohane and Martin 1995, p. 42). In this sense at least, this chapter clearly establishes that cultural factors have an independent causal effect on public opinion toward international trade.

Chapter 3

Feelings First: Non-Material Factors as Moderators of Economic Self-Interest Effects on Trade Preferences

3.1 Introduction

What explains individual attitudes toward trade policy? Studies of public opinion toward international trade have identified a wide array of factors—both material and non-material—as sources of individual trade preferences (e.g., Baker 2005; Beaulieu 2002; Dong et al. 2013; Guisinger 2013; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Jamal and Milner 2013; Kaltenthaler et al. 2004; Kaltenthaler and Miller 2013; Lindsey and Lake 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rankin 2001; Rathbun forthcoming; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Most of these factors, however, can be grouped into two broad categories. The first follows from conventional models of political economy and includes objective indicators of material self-interest with respect to trade, such as an individual's skill level or industry of employment (Alt et al. 1996). The second category comprises a cluster of non-material attitudes that reflect cultural identity or symbolic predispositions of some kind (e.g., nationalism, ethnocentrism,

prejudice, cosmopolitanism, etc.). Taken collectively, existing studies of survey data have shown that both material and symbolic factors affect trade preferences, with some arguing, more radically, that material self-interest plays no role in shaping attitudes toward trade (Dong et al. 2013; Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Indeed, one of the central debates in the extant literature—and in international political economy more broadly—pits these two categories of variables against one another as sources of public opinion (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012).

Studies of trade opinion generally take a uniform approach to this debate: they focus on the average individual and report how much or how little economic and non-economic factors affect preferences over trade. The micro-foundations of preference formation—the particular role of these two types of factors, and their relationship to one another—have not yet been theorized or investigated empirically. This chapter takes a substantial step in that direction. I build a theoretical framework informed by psychology to illuminate, and ultimately break, the dichotomous "material versus non-material" debate that has come to characterize this area of study.

Using new data from a survey of over 4,000 American workers and focusing on industry of employment as an indicator of objective material self-interest, I demonstrate that sentiment toward foreign cultural influences—a symbolic, non-material factor—enjoys priority over economic self-interest in the formation of public opinion toward international trade. I do not simply argue that these cultural attitudes are a stronger predictor of individual trade preferences relative to sector of employment. Rather, I show that the strength of one's symbolic attitudes *conditions the effect* of the conventional economic variable. Specifically, only when attitudes toward foreign cultural influences are weak or neutral[1] do the considerations of material self-interest associated with industry of employment have any effect on trade opinion. When such attitudes are strong in either direction, whether positive or negative—i.e., when an individual deviates from a neutral position on the symbolic attitudes scale—the effect of economic self-interest fades completely.

[1]In this chapter, the terms "weak" and "neutral" are both used to characterize the symbolic attitudes of an individual who, on a given attitudinal scale, does not feel particularly strongly in either direction. This characterization is defined more precisely in my discussion of the data below.

The implications of this finding are striking: symbolic attitudes and industry effects do not reinforce or counterbalance each other in this context; rather, material self-interest is a "second order" consideration that acquires salience only when strong sentiments toward foreign cultural influences are lacking. Consistent with theories of preference formation in psychology, my findings suggest that symbolic attitudes enjoy a higher level of priority in the formation of trade preferences: they are "first order" factors that can altogether trump the contribution of economic self-interest to an individual's position on international trade. Put differently, I show that non-material factors *define the scope conditions* for longstanding models of trade preferences based on rational economic self-interest.

The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows. I begin by presenting the theoretical foundation of my argument, building upon the notion of heuristic judgment from behavioral economics and the theory of symbolic politics from political psychology. I advance a theoretical framework that accounts for both material and symbolic factors, and importantly, specifies the relationship between the two. In Section 3.3, I turn to the data and describe the dependent and independent variables of interest in this study. Section 3.4 presents the results of my statistical analysis. First, I follow the approach prevalent among existing studies of public opinion in IPE and analyze the sample as a whole. I show that, while attitudes toward foreign cultural influences are generally stronger predictors of individual trade preferences, objective material self-interest, captured by industry of employment, matters greatly as well. Second, I turn to the heart of my argument: I use split sample and interaction analysis to establish the priority of cultural attitudes over industry-based economic considerations in the formation of trade preferences. Section 3.5 considers the robustness of my findings, while Section 3.6 concludes.

3.2 From Affect to Opinion: Trade Preferences and the Theory of Symbolic Politics

Rationality, as a cognitive process, can be very demanding. As research in social psychology indicates, the mind relies on shortcuts wherever possible to avoid the effortful mental work of conscious and deliberate reasoning. This idea is famously articulated by

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who argued in their Nobel prize-winning work that individuals use "heuristics"[2] to simplify complex decisions into quick, intuitive judgments (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Such heuristics are not consciously chosen. Rather, they are part of a "mental shotgun" whereby the mind instinctively evades the demanding work of complex reasoning by substituting an easier question for a difficult one—typically without noticing the substitution (Kahneman 2011).

One of the most commonly used intuitive heuristics in decision making involves reliance on emotion or *affect* (Kahneman 2011; Sears 2001).[3] The notion of affective judgment was introduced into the heuristics lexicon by psychologist Paul Slovic as an *affect heuristic* (Slovic et al. 2002). Building on the work of Kahneman and Tversky, Slovic observed a process of decision making in which judgments are guided directly by reflexive gut feelings of liking and disliking, without deliberation or reasoning. The affect heuristic, in other words, is an instance of substitution where the answer to an easy question (How do I *feel* about it?) serves subconsciously as an answer to a much harder question (What do I *think* about it?).

The world of politics is not immune to the shortcuts of the human mind. In the realm of political preference formation, the notion of judgment through affective response finds prominent expression in the theory of symbolic politics. According to this theory, people acquire early in life a set of broad and highly stable "symbolic" predispositions (e.g., prejudice, nationalism, political ideology) which drives their attitudes toward particular political issues in adulthood (Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 1980).[4] Importantly, symbolic predispositions drive political preferences by way of the affective shortcuts discussed above. Later in life, as an individual is confronted with new and unfamiliar policy issues, the symbols posed by those issues evoke habitual and highly affective responses based on the person's longstanding symbolic attitudes. As Sears et al. explained when they introduced the theory in the late 1970s, the political symbols posed by issues such as "in-

[2]The technical definition of heuristic is "a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions" (Kahneman 2011).

[3]I follow Neuman et al. (2007) and use the terms "emotion" and "affect" interchangeably.

[4]The terms "symbolic attitudes" and "symbolic predispositions" are also used interchangeably in this chapter.

tegration" and "affirmative action," for example, evoke habitual and emotional responses based on underlying predispositions such as racial tolerance or prejudice (1979). More recently, it has been shown that racial attitudes are an important driver of public opinion toward health care reform policy in the United States (Tesler 2012). The policy—widely known as "Obamacare"—is closely associated with an African American President, and thus, as a policy issue, it evokes an automatic gut reaction rooted in attitudes toward race.

The theory of symbolic politics therefore implies a distinctive mode of information processing which proceeds by way of strong affective responses to political symbols. In the arena of mass politics, then, strong symbolic predispositions make possible the cognitive shortcut of judgment via affect: when the relevant predispositions are sufficiently strong, the gut feelings evoked by political issues direct preferences, making a demanding cognitive process unnecessary. Individual preferences toward political issues are thus "formed mainly in congruence with longstanding values about society and the polity, rather than short-term instrumentalities for the satisfaction of one's current private needs" (Sears et al. 1980, p.671).

In the American context, this has been shown to be the case across a variety of issue-areas (Lau and Heldman 2009; Sears et al. 1979; Sears et al. 1980; Tesler and Sears 2009; Tesler 2012). My claim is that, for the majority of individuals, international trade is no exception. The theory of symbolic politics suggests that the symbols associated with trade—it represents a transaction with a "foreign other," for instance—evoke an affective response based on general and stable symbolic predispositions such as attitudes toward out-groups or foreignness. To put it in the language of heuristics, the difficult and complex question —"What do I think about trade?"—is displaced by the much easier question: "How do I feel about it?"

Importantly, symbolic attitudes evoke responses which are *spontaneous* rather than deliberate, *automatic* rather than intentional or voluntary, and of course, highly *affective* rather than cognitive (Sears 1993). They are, in other words, "primary" and "basic," independent of prior cognitive appraisals (Sears 1993; Zajonc 1980). According to a model

of trade preferences informed by psychology, then, symbolic predispositions enjoy a position of priority. Among those with strong symbolic attitudes toward foreign cultural influences (i.e., those most likely to react with an automatic, emotional response to the political issue of international trade), preferences should be unaffected by the rational calculus of self-interest. When the relevant symbolic predispositions are strong, the symbolic meaning of international trade as a political attitude object evokes an emotional, gut-level response that renders a cognitive appraisal unnecessary. In other words, an affect heuristic is readily available and the simplifying substitution is made.

When strong symbolic predispositions are lacking, on the other hand, the theory of symbolic politics expects that other—likely rational—considerations will come into play. For example, in a recent study of racial predispositions and vote choice in the 2008 American presidential election, Tesler and Sears conclude that unlike racial liberals and racial conservatives, racial "moderates"—those who are neither especially sympathetic nor especially unsympathetic toward blacks—voted according to the prevailing short-term forces of the election year (e.g., an evaluation of economic conditions, disapproval of Bush's Iraq policy) and thus, helped offset Obama's poor performance among racial conservatives (2009). The implication for attitudes toward international trade is clear: rational considerations should affect only those who are neither cultural xenophobes nor cosmopolitans. In other words, only when symbolic attitudes are neutral do I expect to observe self-interest effects on individual trade preferences.[5]

3.3 Data

The data I use in this study comes from a survey administered by the Harvard Globalization Survey (HGS) Project to measure attitudes toward global economic integration

[5]Although the theory I present here is novel in its application to international political economy at the micro level, a similar argument is made at the macro level by Rawi Abdelal in his study of economic policy in three post-Soviet states (2001). Interestingly, Abdelal argues that in the absence of a strong national identity (i.e., when the national identity of a society is ambiguous and ambivalent), governments are likely to respond to short-term material incentives, falling back on the pursuit of economic goals such as the maximization of societal wealth and economic consumption. When national identity is strong and uncontested, on the other hand, a country's economic policy is defined and directly guided by social purpose, with economic goals linked to the protection and cultivation of the nation.

among a sample of over 4,000 U.S. workers from selected industries. The survey design followed a customized two-stage sampling approach in which first, a set of 12 key industries (five in manufacturing, the rest in services) were identified based on a number criteria reflecting variation in exposure to the impacts of globalization (i.e., factor intensity, value-added per worker, trade balance, exposure to offshoring activity, dependence on immigrant labor, and total employment). The 12 industries included in the sample were chosen to provide suitably wide variation along these dimensions of interest and to cover the whole range of industries along them.[6] Once the targeted industries were identified, a sizeable sample of currently employed, native workers was recruited from each. The sample sizes obtained for each sector are roughly proportional to the size of that industry. The survey was fielded online by YouGov/Polimetrix between September 2010 and February 2011.

3.3.1 Dependent Variables

As measures of individual attitudes toward international trade, I rely on responses to three separate questions on the HGS survey:

> *We would like to learn about your views on trade with other countries - by trade we mean American business and individuals buying goods from other countries or selling goods to other countries.*

1. *Do you think that restrictions on buying goods made in other countries should be increased, decreased, or kept at the current level?*
2. *Do you think that trade with other countries is good or bad for you and your family?*
3. *Do you think that trade with other countries is good or bad for the United States as a whole?*

[6]The manufacturing industries include: food manufacturing, chemical manufacturing, computer and electronic product manufacturing, transportation equipment manufacturing, and fabricated metal product manufacturing. The service industries are: construction, telecommunications, educational services, ambulatory health care services, nursing and residential care, financial services, and internet and data processing services.

In the case of the first question, response options reflect a five-point scale ranging from "Increase greatly" to "Decrease greatly." I use responses to this item to code the first of my dependent variables, a binary indicator of protectionism which takes a value of 1 for respondents who think that restrictions on trade should be greatly or somewhat increased, and 0 otherwise. Answer categories for the second two questions also span a five-point scale, this time ranging from "Very good" to "Very bad." I construct two further binary dependent variables, each corresponding to one of these two questions. These indicators take a value of 1 for respondents who believe trade is very bad or somewhat bad for themselves (or the United States), and 0 otherwise.

The dependent variables in this analysis, therefore, are binary measures of (I) support for restrictions on buying goods made in other countries (*Tariff Support*), (II) the perception of trade's impact (good or bad) on one's self and family (*Bad Self Impact*), and (III) the perception of trade's impact (good or bad) on the United States as a whole (*Bad US Impact*). Notice that only the first of these variables is based on a direct measure of individual attitudes toward trade *policy*. The second two variables reflect individual beliefs about trade's personal or country-level impact. While I am ultimately interested in preferences toward policy, I believe that treating such beliefs as dependent variables is very useful in the context of this study for at least two reasons. First, and most importantly, beliefs about trade's personal and country-level impacts are very strongly associated with individual policy preferences, both in this data and in other surveys of trade opinion (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Fordham and Kleinberg 2012). Thus, the factors driving these beliefs are also very likely to be indirectly affecting opinion toward trade policy. Second, one could reasonably suggest that where perceptions of trade's impact on self and family are concerned, considerations of material self-interest should play a particularly strong role. Treating perceptions of personal impact as a dependent variable, therefore, sets up a particularly difficult test for the role and effect of non-material factors in the process of trade preference formation.

3.3.2 Independent Variables

The HGS survey provides an especially good measure of anti-foreign sentiment with the following question:

> *People have different views on whether exposure to cultural influence from other countries is positive or negative for American society. In your view, what is the impact of foreign cultural influences on American society?*

This question offered respondents five answer categories, ranging from "Very positive" to "Very negative."

The instrument used by the HGS survey to gauge pro- or anti-foreign sentiment is especially perfect given the aims of this chapter. First, and most importantly, respondents have the option of expressing a weak or neutral stance toward foreign cultural influences: in response to the above question, individuals can answer "Neither positive nor negative," indicating a moderate position on this attitudinal scale. Second, notice that the question is concerned with cultural foreign influences; it says nothing about economic or even political interaction with foreigners. In an open-ended follow-up question, respondents who attributed a negative impact to foreign cultural influences were asked to specify the cultural threats with which they are concerned. Not a single respondent voiced economic or economic-related concerns.

Finally, unlike some other indicators of symbolic or identity-related attitudes which have been employed in studies of trade preferences, the HGS measure reflects a more realistic conception of identity by allowing cosmopolitan attitudes to coexist with a modest level of national or in-group pride. Consider, for instance, a measure of nationalism that asks respondents whether they would rather be a citizen of their own country over any other country in the world (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Rankin 2001). Such a question does not allow for a clean separation of genuine cultural xenophobia from a type of tempered patriotism which can comfortably coexist with a strong cosmopolitan orientation. We can easily imagine an individual, for example, who holds

positive attitudes toward foreign cultures and influences, who does not believe that his country is necessarily "better" than other countries in the world, but who is, nonetheless, a proud citizen with no desire to exchange his citizenship.

Given the particular design of this study, and my argument that the effect of material self-interest depends upon neutral symbolic attitudes, a related problem arises when the measure of these attitudes cannot distinguish individuals who hold a neutral stance from those who hold a positive one. The measure of ethnocentrism[7] employed by Mansfield and Mutz's study of trade preferences (2009) demonstrates this point. The measure is obtained by asking an individual about some positive and some negative human characteristics with reference to her (racial/ethnic) in-group as well as her out-groups. Specifically, ethnocentrism is the *difference* between the mean for positive-negative characteristic attributed to the in-group and the same characteristics attributed to the out-group.[8]

This particular and widely used measure of ethnocentrism enables easy identification of the prejudiced and xenophobic. It makes it especially hard, however, to distinguish between those who hold genuinely positive attitudes toward out-groups and those who are neutral. How should we classify those who obtain a score of (roughly) zero on the ethnocentrism scale, indicating that they view members of out-groups as equal to members of their own group? Are such individuals "positives" or "neutrals"? Recall that obtaining a less-than-zero (on my definition, "positive") score on the ethnocentrism scale indicates a bias against one's own group—a bias we cannot expect to necessarily observe even among those who have strong cosmopolitan outlook.

The question posed on the HGS survey about the impact of foreign cultural influences thus lends itself particularly well to the design and aims of this chapter. It makes it possible to cleanly distinguish prejudice and xenophobia from moderate patriotism, and offers reliable distinctions between those who hold negative, neutral, and positive sentiments

[7]In this context, ethnocentrism refers to the tendency to think less of those who are racially or ethnically different from one's own group

[8]For example, respondents are asked: "Next are some questions about various groups in our society. Below are seven-point scales on which you can rate characteristics of people in different groups. Where would you rate [BLACKS/WHITES/HISPANIC-AMERICANS] on these scales?" The scales represent positive-negative characteristics including Hard-Working-Lazy, Efficient-Wasteful, and Trustworthy-Untrustworthy.

toward foreignness. From responses to this question, I construct *Cultural Sentiment*, a three-point measure of attitudes toward foreign cultural influences, where positive equals 1, neutral equals 2, and negative equals 3.[9]

To capture the material self-interest implications of individuals' industry of employment,[10] I construct *Import Industry*, a dummy variable that is coded according to the net trade balance of a respondent's sector of employment.[11] Respondents employed in industries with a negative trade balance are coded as 1, while all others are coded as 0.[12] With respect to attitudes toward trade, there is no detectable difference between those working in export-oriented industries and those working in non-tradables; I have therefore kept the variable binary. Industry classifications are according to three-digit North American Industry Classification System codes, which is standard in the literature on trade preferences.

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Whole Sample Analysis

To begin, I take the approach that is prevalent among existing studies of trade opinion and analyze the sample as a whole. I estimate a logit model for each of my three dependent variables, including *Cultural Sentiment* as the measure of symbolic attitudes and *Import Industry* as an indicator of economic self-interest. For each case, first differences associated with changes in cultural attitudes and industry of employment are reported in Table 3.1.[13] These results demonstrate two points. First, both material and non-material

[9]In this data, roughly 53% of respondents are "positives," 28% are "neutrals," and the remaining 19% are "negatives."

[10]According the Ricardo-Viner model, in which one (or more) of the factors of production is assumed to be "specific" or immobile between industries, economic returns to factors of production are tied closely to the fortunes of the industry in which they are employed. Thus, those employed in import-competing sectors are expected to suffer a real decrease in returns as a result of trade (Jones 1971).

[11]Industry trade balances are calculated from 2010 data on U.S. imports and exports (United States International Trade Commission 2010).

[12]Recall from the beginning of this section that the sample was drawn from 12 targeted industries.

[13]Full regression tables for all the analysis presented in this chapter are included in Appendix B.

factors play an important role, on average, in the formation of individual preferences over trade. With the exception of Model 2, where *Bad US Impact* is the dependent variable, both cultural xenophobia and employment in an industry with a negative trade balance are significant predictors of negative trade-related attitudes. For example, and as reported in Table 3.2, a move from positive to negative on the three-point *Cultural Sentiment* scale increases the predicted probability of tariff support by 27.2%, while employment in an import industry represents a 22.2% increase in that probability.

Table 3.1: Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Protectionism (DV=1), Whole Sample.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	DV=*Bad Self Impact*	DV=*Bad US Impact*	DV=*Tariff Support*
Cultural Sentiment	0.183	0.237	0.091
(positive to negative)	(0.145, 0.224)	(0.194, 0.280)	(0.047, 0.138)
Import Industry	0.042	0.026	0.077
(0 to 1)	(0.013, 0.077)	(-0.004, 0.058)	(0.037, 0.116)

Note: 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Models include a full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income, and economic knowledge). In the analysis above, these other variables are held at their means.

Table 3.2: Percentage Increases in the Predicted Probabilities of Protectionism (DV=1), Whole Sample.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	DV=*Bad Self Impact*	DV=*Bad US Impact*	DV=*Tariff Support*
Cultural Sentiment	+147.6%	+173.0%	+27.2%
(positive to negative)	(from 0.124 to 0.307)	(from 0.137 to 0.374)	(from 0.334 to 0.425)
Import Industry	+25.9%	+13.6%	+22.2%
(0 to 1)	(from 0.162 to 0.204)	(from 0.191 to 0.217)	(from 0.346 to 0.423)

Note: Models include a full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income, and economic knowledge). In the analysis above, these other variables are held at their means.

Second, and looking across the three dependent variables, the impact of cultural

attitudes on trade opinion appears to be stronger than industry effects—in most cases, overwhelmingly so. For instance, respondents who hold negative attitudes toward foreign cultural influences are one and a half times more likely than those with positive cultural attitudes to believe that trade is bad for them and their family. A change from 0 to 1 on the *Import Industry* indicator, on the other hand, results in only a 26% increase in the probability of believing that trade is bad for one's self and family.

My analysis thus far has confirmed that, on average, both material and non-material factors "matter," and that symbolic factors are generally dominant predictors of trade-related opinion. The preceding results, however, tell us little else about the micro-foundations of public opinion with respect to trade. In the sub-sections that follow, I advance the limits of scholarship on this front by taking a novel approach to the data.

3.4.2 Split Sample Analysis

My argument is that symbolic predispositions enjoy a higher level of priority in the formation of preferences: they are first order factors that moderate the impact of industry considerations on an individual's position toward international trade. Specifically, I hypothesize that the effect of material self-interest (in this case, the effect of *Import Industry*) depends upon the strength of cultural attitudes: only when attitudes toward foreign cultural influences are weak do the material self-interest considerations associated with industry of employment have any effect on preferences over trade.

To test this proposition, I first conduct a split sample analysis of the data. I divide the data into three according to the value of *Cultural Sentiment* and, in each sub-sample, separately regress my three measures of trade attitudes on *Import Industry* and the set of baseline covariates. I expect to observe strong industry effects on the outcome variables in the neutral group, but not in the sub-samples comprising individuals with either negative or positive attitudes toward foreign cultural influences. The results, presented in Tables 3.3-3.5 are striking.

In the case of all three dependent variables—*Bad Self Impact, Bad US Impact, and Tariff Support*—the logit coefficient on *Import Industry* is highly significant statistically

Table 3.3: Effect of industry on *Bad Self Impact* by value of *Cultural Sentiment*.

Value of *Cultural Sentiment*	Coefficient on *Import Industry*	*p*-value	Observations
Positive	0.234 (-0.108, 0.577)	0.179	1995
Neutral	0.607 (0.267, 0.947)	0.000	1040
Negative	-0.099 (-0.485, 0.288)	0.616	703

Note: Logit coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Each row provides the estimate of the logit coefficient obtained from a separate regression of *Bad Self Impact* on *Import Industry* and a full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income, and economic knowledge).

Table 3.4: Effect of industry on *Bad US Impact* by value of *Cultural Sentiment*.

Value of *Cultural Sentiment*	Coefficient on *Import Industry*	*p*-value	Observations
Positive	0.067 (-0.266, 0.400)	0.694	1994
Neutral	0.538 (0.203, 0.874)	0.002	1044
Negative	-0.190 (-0.570, 0.190)	0.327	703

Note: Logit coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Each row provides the estimate of the logit coefficient obtained from a separate regression of *Bad US Impact* on *Import Industry* and a full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income, and economic knowledge).

Table 3.5: Effect of industry on *Tariff Support* by value of *Cultural Sentiment*.

Value of *Cultural Sentiment*	Coefficient on *Import Industry*	*p*-value	Observations
Positive	0.223 (-0.012, 0.459)	0.063	1994
Neutral	0.516 (0.213, 0.819)	0.001	1044
Negative	0.284 (-0.072, 0.640)	0.118	704

Note: Logit coefficients are shown with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Each row provides the estimate of the logit coefficient obtained from a separate regression of *Tariff Support* on *Import Industry* and a full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income, and economic knowledge).

in the neutral group, but does not attain conventional levels of significance in either the positive or negative sub-samples. Moreover, when beliefs about trade's personal and country-level impact are the outcome variables, the coefficient estimate on *Import*

Industry takes the wrong (i.e., negative) sign for those on the negative end of the *Cultural Sentiment* scale.

To provide a more intuitive sense of these results, Figures 3.1-3.3 graphically present, as a function of *Cultural Sentiment*, the change in the predicted probability of each dependent variable equaling 1 (i.e., the probability of protectionism) when the value of *Import Industry* moves from 0 to 1. The vertical lines denote the 95% confidence intervals for each point estimate, and all other variables are held at their means.

Figure 3.1: Change in Predicted Probability of *Bad Self Impact*=1, Changing *Import Industry* from 0 to 1.



Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 3.2: Change in Predicted Probability of *Bad US Impact*=1, Changing *Import Industry* from 0 to 1.



Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other variables are held at their means.

Figure 3.3: Change in Predicted Probability of *Tariff Support*=1, Changing *Import Industry* from 0 to 1.



Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other variables are held at their means.

Note that in the case of all three outcome variables, the confidence interval on the estimated change in the predicted probability of protectionism crosses zero when *Cultural Sentiment* is either positive or negative. In sharp contrast, employment in an import-competing sector substantially increases the probability of holding negative attitudes toward international trade in the neutral category. Among neutrals, a change from 0 to 1 on the Import Industry indicator results in a 36% increase in the probability of tariff support (from 0.337 to 0.460), a 49% increase in the probability of believing that trade is bad for the country as a whole (from 0.222 to 0.333), and a 57% increase (from 0.195 to 0.307) in the probability of viewing trade as bad for one's self and family.

3.4.3 Interaction Analysis

Next, to check the robustness of the preceding results, I return to the sample in its entirety and jointly test the conditional relationship suggested above by interacting cultural attitudes with *Import Industry*. As Figures 3.1-3.3 clearly demonstrate, the conditional relationship I am positing is not a linear one: when the cultural variable takes its middle

value of 2 (i.e., neutral), the import dummy has a strong effect on trade opinion; this is not the case, however, when *Cultural Sentiment* takes its extreme values of 1 (positive) or 3 (negative). A straight interaction of the two variables would thus not capture the relationship. To take this non-linearity into account, I transform the three-point *Cultural Sentiment* variable into a *Neutral Sentiment* dummy, where *Neutral Sentiment* equals 1 when *Cultural Sentiment* is neutral, and 0 otherwise. I then interact the import dummy with this new variable to obtain *Import Industry* Neutral Sentiment*.

My particular coding of *Neutral Sentiment* means that, for the purpose of this analysis, I treat those with positive and negative cultural attitudes as equivalent. I believe this to be a defensible decision: the split sample results presented above show that the effect of *Import Industry* fades dramatically as cultural attitudes deviate from neutral in *either* direction. It is thus very unlikely that observations from only one of the extremes could drive the interaction I am testing. Table 3.6 presents the results of the interaction analysis.

Table 3.6: Interaction between *Import Industry* and *Neutral Sentiment*.

	DV=*Bad Self Impact*	DV=*Bad US Impact*	DV=*Tariff Support*
Import Industry	0.119	0.002	0.250
	(p=0.342)	(p=0.985)	(p=0.011)
Neutral Sentiment	0.045	-0.008	-0.064
	(p=0.688)	(p=0.942)	(p=0.481)
*Import Industry**	0.470	0.500	0.267
Neutral Sentiment	(p=0.024)	(p=0.014)	(p=0.130)

Note: Logit coefficients are shown with p-values in parentheses. A full set of baseline covariates (i.e., gender, race, party ID, union membership, education, income, and economic knowledge) was included.

The analysis confirms that, at least where perceptions of trade's impact on self and country are concerned, the effect of industry is conditional upon neutral attitudes toward foreign cultural in influences. As Table 3.6 shows, when the dependent variable is *Bad Self Impact* or *Bad US Impact*, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term carry p-values smaller than 0.05.

3.5 Further Robustness Checks and Alternative Interpretations

How do we know that symbolic attitudes are in fact *primary*? I have demonstrated that the strength of cultural attitudes conditions the effect of industry-based self-interest on individual trade preferences, but to establish that symbolic attitudes are truly primary, I must show that the reverse conditional relationship does not also hold. Might it be that when economic self-interest is strong (i.e., when one works in an industry threatened by imports), the effect of cultural sentiment on trade opinion also dissipates?

Notice that, conveniently, this *reverse* conditional relationship would *not* be characterized by a corresponding non-linearity: the effect of cultural attitudes on trade opinion would simply vary as we move from those employed in import-competing industries to those who do not. Therefore, to test *this* potential conditional relationship, an interaction of the import dummy with the original three-point *Cultural Sentiment* variable is the appropriate one. I thus interact *Import Industry* with *Cultural Sentiment* to get *Import Industry*Cultural Sentiment*. Interaction analysis using this new term confirms that the reverse conditional relationship does not hold. The coefficient on the interaction term is *not* statistically significant for any of the three outcome variables, ruling out the possibility that the effect of cultural attitudes depends upon the value of the economic self-interest measure.

To further confirm the priority of symbolic attitudes, I perform reverse split sample analysis, this time dividing the data according to the value of *Import Industry* (i.e., import-competing or not) in order to test whether the effect of cultural attitudes on trade opinion is markedly weaker—or in fact, non-existent—among those with strong economic interests. The results again provide a sharp contrast to the split sample analysis presented earlier. For all three dependent variables, the impact of symbolic attitudes on trade opinion is statistically significant (p-values ≤ 0.01) in both the import-competing and non-import-competing sub-samples, with comparable substantive effects across the two groups. In fact, and as shown in Figure 3.4, when *Tariff Support* is the dependent variable, the estimated impact of negative cultural attitudes on the probability of protectionism is

greater among those who work in import-competing industries versus those who do not.

Figure 3.4: Change in Predicted Probability of *Tariff Support*=1, Changing *Cultural Sentiment* from 1 to 3.



Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All other variables are held at their means.

Alternatively, it might be argued that some *other* characteristic distinguishing the neutral group from both the positive and negative groups (i.e., something other than neutral symbolic attitudes) is driving the main results of this chapter. Could it be, for instance, that the results I present in the preceding sections indicate, not that symbolic factors enjoy priority over self-interest considerations, but rather, that individuals in the neutral group are better equipped to identify their material self-interest relative to those in the positive or negative groups? For example, it might be true that neutrals are, on average, better informed or more knowledgeable than their positive or negative counterparts. Figures 3.5-3.8, however, clearly demonstrate that this is not the case. By a variety of measures—frequency of news consumption, interest in news, economic knowledge, and education—positives and negatives are at least as equally informed, and in most cases significantly more informed, than individuals in the neutral group.

Figure 3.5: Mean Weekly Frequency of Reading, Watching, or Listening to News by Value of *Cultural Sentiment*.



Note: Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3.6: Mean Measure of Interest in News by Value of *Cultural Sentiment*.



Note: Interest in news and public affairs as reported by respondents on a four-point scale. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3.7: Mean Measure of Economic Knowledge by Value of *Cultural Sentiment*.



Note: Economic knowledge was measured with a multiple choice question which asked respondents: "What must the government do to reduce high inflation?" Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3.8: Mean of Education by Value of *Cultural Sentiment*



Note: Education was measured on a six-point scale. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Table 3.7: Standardized Differences[†] of Covariate Means Across Neutral and Positive/Negative Groups.

	Standardized Difference of Means	
Baseline Characteristics	Positive vs. Neutral Groups	Negative vs. Neutral Groups
Import-Competing	-0.079	0.051
Female	0.031	0.208
Union Member	0.006	-0.016
Republican (vs. other)	-0.379	0.184
White (vs. other)	0.016	0.102
Education	0.612	0.035

[†]Standardized difference = difference in means or proportions divided by standard error, with imbalance defined as absolute value greater than 0.20.

Nor does it appear to be the case that there is some other covariate imbalance between the neutral group and *both* of the other two categories. Table 3.7 shows that even when there is an imbalance between the neutral group and another category (in the case of education, for example), the imbalance exists only in one direction: we do not observe any imbalance between both the neutral and positive categories, *and* the neutral and negative ones. This casts serious doubt on the possibility that neutrals are somehow distinct from their negative and positive counterparts in some other way that could make their trade preferences more susceptible to the impact of industry.

Finally, one might be concerned about differences in the variance of the outcome variables across the subgroups. Specifically, if there is little variance on the trade opinion variables in the positive and negative groups versus in the neutral one, we might worry that this is why the effect of industry is picked up only in the neutral category. We do not, however, observe differences of this kind for any of the dependent variables.

Another set of concerns might stem from the possibility that the self-interested preferences expressed by neutrals are *also* driven by cognitive shortcuts and automatic gut responses. I have argued that rational self-interest considerations become salient when strong symbolic attitudes—and the resulting affective shortcuts—are unavailable in the context of trade. One could counter, however, that an economically self-interested posi-

tion on trade might also be the product of some cognitive shortcut. Most notably, the cue-based heuristic provided by the policy position of one's trade union has been suggested as an obvious possibility (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). But closer analysis of the data dispels these concerns, at least insofar as cues from union groups are concerned. Those who work in import-competing industries are no more likely to be unionized. Among unionized workers, those who work in import-competing sectors are no more likely to know their union's stance on trade, to perceive their union's stance to be protectionist, or to receive anti-trade messages from their union.

To further test the robustness of this study's findings, I repeat the analysis of Section 3.4 using a continuous measure of import penetration rather than the binary variable *Import Industry*. To construct this continuous measure, *ImportCont*, I take the natural logarithm of M_i/Y_i where M_i is the volume of imports in sector i and Y_i is the sector's total output. Since the non-tradables industries in my sample do not import goods, and the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, I follow Mansfield and Mutz (2009) and arbitrarily add 0.01 to M_i. Once again, I divide the data into three according to the value of *Cultural Sentiment* and, in each sub-sample, separately regress my three measures of trade attitudes on *ImportCont* and the set of baseline covariates. In the case of all three dependent variables, the logit coefficient on *ImportCont* is substantively large and highly significant statistically in the neutral group (p-value ≤ 0.002), but does not attain conventional levels of significance in either the positive or negative sub-samples. The results of the interaction analysis using a continuous rather than binary measure of import competition also reflect the main findings of this chapter: in the two models where beliefs about trade's personal and country-level impact are the dependent variables, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term *ImportCont*Neutral Sentiment* carry p-values smaller than 0.008.

Substituting a five-point measure of *Cultural Sentiment* for the three-point measure I use in the original analysis also has no bearing on the overall results. Recall that I collapse a five-point attitudinal scale into three categories: those who respond that foreign cultural influences are either "very" or "somewhat" positive (negative) for the United States are

coded as positives (negatives) and treated as equal in the analysis. I make this decision largely to avoid putting undue weight on potentially very subjective differences between those within the positive or negative category. Conducting the split sample analysis on five rather than three categories, however, yields results that mirror my original findings.

Lastly, it might be the case that symbolic predispositions and industry of employment are not independent. We can imagine cultural xenophobes, for instance, avoiding employment in sectors that are exposed to globalization. If an individual's choice of industry is endogenous to her attitude toward foreign cultures, then my findings become susceptible to yet another alternative interpretation: we may not observe independent industry effects among those with strong cultural attitudes because the choice of industry is itself somehow driven by those symbolic attitudes. I find, however, that the distribution of industry is virtually identical across the three categories of *Cultural Sentiment*, and that cultural attitudes and *Import Industry* are not correlated (Pearson's $r = 0.053$). This finding also undermines the possibility of the reverse relationship between industry and cultural attitudes[14]—i.e. cultural sentiment as a function of economic interest. Indeed, this is consistent with the results of the experimental study presented in Chapter 2.

3.6 Conclusion

Taken together, my findings provide strong support for the conclusion that symbolic factors enjoy priority over economic self-interest in the formation of public opinion toward international trade. I show that the effect of industry—a key measure of material self-interest in longstanding political economy models of trade—is conditional upon the strength of an individual's attitude toward foreign cultures. Specifically, only when attitudes toward foreign cultural influences are weak do considerations of material self-interest associated with industry of employment have any effect on trade opinion. When such attitudes are strong in either direction, whether positive or negative (i.e., when an

[14]The accumulated wisdom of political psychology would predict this reverse relationship to be highly unlikely: it is empirically well-established and widely accepted that broad symbolic predispositions form early in life and remain highly stable throughout (Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002).

individual deviates from a neutral stance on the cultural attitudes scale), the effect of economic self-interest fades completely.

The implications of these findings are significant: cultural attitudes and industry effects do not reinforce or counterbalance each other in this context; rather, material self-interest is a second order consideration that acquires salience only when strong symbolic attitudes are lacking. My findings suggest, in other words, that the affective sources of trade opinion associated with identities, values, and symbolic predispositions enjoy primacy in the formation of individual preferences toward trade. Put differently, I show that non-material factors *define the scope conditions* for longstanding models of trade preferences based on rational economic self-interest.

The approach and conclusions of this chapter make a number of significant contributions to the study of public opinion in international political economy, and to the study of international trade more broadly. Most importantly, my theory and findings push scholarship on globalization opinion toward a more nuanced and complete conception of individual preference formation. Students of public opinion in IPE have for some time debated the relative importance of material versus non-material sources of individual preferences over economic globalization, but the role and relationship of these two kinds of factors were never directly addressed. Building upon the concept of affective judgment and the theory of symbolic politics, I advance a theoretical framework that accounts for both material and non-material factors, breaking the dichotomous debate that has come to characterize this area of study.

My argument also highlights possibilities for further, theoretically-informed investigations into both the process and implications of affectively formed preferences in the context of international trade. The theory of symbolic politics suggests that the symbols associated with trade—it is a transaction with a "foreign other," for instance—evoke an affective response based on general and stable symbolic predispositions such as prejudice, nationalism, or attitudes toward foreign cultures. The notion that trade opinion is the product of primarily emotional rather than cognitive responses can shed considerable light, for example, on our understanding of the public discourse and politics of economic

globalization. Economists have long expressed surprise and dismay over the public presentation of globalization in emotionally charged and logically irrelevant terms (Krugman 1996; Mankiw and Swagel 2006).[15] Indeed, a significant proportion of public communications about economic globalization—including pro-globalization messages—are designed to activate symbolic attitudes such as prejudice and nationalism (Skonieczky 2001; Mullainathan et al. 2008). But if individuals, on average, respond to international trade affectively and in accordance with their symbolic predispositions, then the economically irrelevant frames commonly employed by political elites in public discussions of trade policy become expected rather than surprising (Sears 2001).

In a context where trade agreements are increasingly made with specific countries or regions, the primacy of symbolic predispositions in the formation of trade preferences has further important implications for politics and policy. Scholarship on trade opinion is overwhelmingly concerned with preferences over trade in *general*, but polling data indicates that in the United States at least, the public's support for trade varies substantially across trading partners (Kohut et al. 2010). Consistent with the results presented in Chapter 2, the findings of this chapter again strongly suggest that this variation is due to partners' degree of cultural foreignness, not just their economic characteristics. With the primacy of symbolic predispositions established in this study, students of globalization will be much better equipped to investigate these unexplored contours of trade politics, as well as their implications for policy.

More generally, this chapter contributes to the extension of the theory of symbolic politics itself, and to the study of public opinion more broadly. While the theory of symbolic politics implies that rational considerations become salient when strong symbolic predispositions are lacking, it does not advance any explicit hypotheses about preference formation under weak or neutral symbolic attitudes. The argument I have presented

[15]In his leaked Republican playbook, for example, communications strategist Frank Luntz advises Republican Congressional candidates: "Never, never, never begin a response to [economic globalization] by saying it is beneficial to the U.S. economy. Never... Don't talk like economists. The key word is winning. It is essential that you capture the theme of winning and insert it into all your communications efforts" (Luntz 2005). Arnold Schwarzenegger was presumably following such advice when he defended free trade at the 2004 Republican National Convention by exhorting Americans not to be "economic girlie men" (Mullainathan et al. 2008).

extends the theory in that direction. This chapter highlights the possibility that, in areas where symbolic attitudes have a strong impact on behavior or opinion, paying closer attention to those who have neutral attitudes might reveal important second order dynamics at play. My findings also suggest that potentially important relationships might be masked when neutral or weak positions are either ignored or excluded on symbolic and identity-based attitudinal scales.

Finally, the chapter introduces beliefs about the personal and country-level impact of trade as *dependent* rather independent variables in the study of trade opinion. It has already been established that treating such beliefs as independent variables is problematic when expressed trade policy preferences are the outcome to be explained (Fordham Kleinberg 2012). Belief variables, however, have not been sufficiently exploited as dependent variables in this context. Given that these beliefs are extremely strong predictors of policy preferences, the factors driving them are also very likely to be indirectly affecting individual preferences over policy. Including them as additional outcome variables will afford us greater leverage in explaining public opinion toward globalization.

While the empirical evidence in support of my argument is clearly strong, a few caveats are necessary. This study has focused on only one measure of economic self-interest—albeit a very central one. The absence of a clean and direct measure of individual skill in this data precludes testing the argument using a skill-based measure of workers' material self-interest.[16] This study, like nearly all other studies of individual trade preferences,[17] is also limited in that it derives trade opinion from questions about international trade in general. A more faithful test of the theory of industry-based trade preferences would, of course, require a study of attitudes toward protection for *specific* industries, with the expectation that individuals will favor protective measures for their own industry, but not for others. More recent trade theory also suggests that trade liberalization might create winners and losers within each industry (Melitz 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008;

[16]Education is of course measured, but it is hardly a measure of skill alone. Indeed, Rho and Tomz (2013) have recently shown that the negative correlation between education and protectionism is unlikely to reflect a desire to maximize returns to one's own factors of production. A measure of occupation is not correlated with trade preferences in this data.

[17]The only exception of which I am aware is Rho and Tomz (2013).

Osgood 2012). As better measures and tests of these alternative accounts of material self-interest emerge, the broader validity of my theory can also be tested.

Finally, the design of this study cannot rule out the possibility that under some relatively rare and extreme economic circumstances, material self-interest might overwhelm symbolic predispositions even among those who hold strong symbolic attitudes. If the loss of one's economic livelihood is clearly and directly threatened—that is to say, when the trade-related threat to material welfare is direct, immediate, and great—economic survival may indeed dominate all other considerations.[18] But this qualification does not detract from the overall force and significance of my argument. What this chapter has shown is that among the broad mass of voters, and at least where a central and long-standing measure of material self-interest is concerned, symbolic factors enjoy a higher level of priority in the formation of trade preferences: symbolic predispositions are first order factors that can altogether trump the contribution of economic self-interest to an individual's stance on international trade.

[18]Joshua Kertzer, for example, makes a related point, showing that when economic circumstances reach a certain threshold, the effect of more subjective assessments on isolationist foreign policy attitudes dissipates (Kertzer 2013).

Chapter 4

Whom Does Trade Help? Foreign-Regarding Considerations as a Source of Trade Preferences

4.1 Introduction

In recent years, subjective beliefs about the impact of international trade have been advanced as key sources of individual trade preferences. Two types of subjective beliefs, in particular, have received attention. First, it has been argued that regardless of trade's objective implications for self-interest, beliefs about trade's effect on one's self and family might be significant drivers of trade opinion. Second, and much more prominently, sociotropic perceptions—beliefs about how trade affects one's country as a whole—have been presented as important sources of attitudes toward international trade (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). Interestingly, however, the possibility that trade preferences are shaped by beliefs about the impact of trade *beyond* one's borders has neither been raised nor investigated.

This chapters introduces the notion of *foreign-regarding* considerations into the study of globalization opinion, arguing that perceptions of trade's impact *abroad* can shape

public opinion toward trade at home. Specifically, I contend that the trade preferences of "cosmopolitan" individuals (i.e., those with very positive attitudes toward out-groups) are especially susceptible to the effect of foreign-regarding concerns. To examine these claims empirically, I employ a creative survey experiment fielded on a nationally representative sample of Americans, supplementing the results with an analysis of open-ended responses provided by all the subjects. Taken together, the findings provide the first evidence of foreign-regarding motivations in the context of trade preferences.

This study is primarily motivated by a puzzling observation: against theoretical expectations derived from political psychology, cosmopolitans are *not* indifferent to the cultural foreignness of trading partners. Rather, individuals with highly positive attitudes toward out-groups display a pattern of reverse discrimination, favoring trade with countries that are more culturally distant. In the section that follows, I introduce this empirical puzzle, considering first the theoretical relationship between symbolic attitudes and individual trade preferences, and highlighting the observable implications of this relationship for the preferences of individuals at opposite ends of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum (i.e., prejudiced individuals versus cosmopolitans). Next, in Section 4.3, I turn to foreign-regarding concerns as a potential explanation for the observed reverse discrimination, arguing that cosmopolitan trade preferences are motivated by beliefs about trade's impact abroad. Section 4.4 describes the design of the study, while Sections 4.5 and 4.6 present the empirical analysis and results. Finally, I consider some potential objections to my argument before presenting the conclusions and implications of the chapter in Section 4.8.

A brief word at the outset about my use of the term "cosmopolitan" will be useful. Cosmopolitanism is a rich concept with a long history. The term has been used to characterize a wide variety of attitudes, particularly in moral and political philosophy. In that literature, the core idea shared by cosmopolitans is typically the view that all human beings are citizens of a single community, regardless of race or nationality (Appiah 2006; Caney 2005; Scheffler 2001). In this chapter, however, I adopt a relatively narrow definition, using the term simply as a label: here, cosmopolitans are those who fall on

one extreme of the symbolic attitudinal scale—namely, those who hold highly positive attitudes toward out-groups.

4.2 Attitudes toward Out-Groups and Public Opinion toward International Trade

For over a decade, students of international political economy have observed a strong statistical association between symbolic attitudes[1] of various kinds and public opinion toward international trade. These findings consistently reveal that negative attitudes toward out-groups (i.e., prejudice, ethnocentrism, nationalistic chauvinism, etc.) are associated with protectionism, while positive out-group attitudes are strongly correlated with support for economic exchange across borders. However, this association between symbolic attitudes and trade opinion has generally been framed with an emphasis on the *negative* end of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum.

For example, Sinnott and O'Rourke (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) analyze cross-national survey data and report that various measures of nationalist sentiment are strongly correlated with protectionist trade preferences. Likewise, Rankin (2001) argues that nationalistic attachment is a key factor in explaining opposition to trade. Focusing on the United States, Rankin finds that attachment to what he calls "patriotic," "sovereign," and "cultural" conceptions of national identity are all highly correlated with protectionism. To capture symbolic attitudes, Mansfield and Mutz's 2009 study of American trade opinion relies primarily on ethnocentrism scales designed to tap "prejudice, broadly conceived" (p. 440). As the study reports, the association between ethnocentrism and negative trade sentiment is very strong. More recently, Dong et al. (2013) replicate Mansfield and Mutz's finding using a sample of Chinese citizens, reporting that prejudiced Chinese citizens are more likely to oppose international trade.

In Chapter 2, I investigated the nature of the association between prejudice and protectionism in an experimental setting, showing that prejudice has a causal effect on trade opinion, and that this effect is very large. Specifically, I took inspiration from

[1]The terms "symbolic attitudes" and "symbolic predispositions" are also used interchangeably in this chapter.

Bertrand and Mullainathan's famous resume experiment (2004)—where names on identical resumes are manipulated to identify the presence of racial discrimination in the U.S. labor market—to investigate the effect of "cultural distance" from trading partners on individual trade preferences. The survey experiment, fielded on a nationally representative sample of Americans, isolated the effect of cultural distance by manipulating only the name of a hypothetical foreign firm that would be affected by a potential U.S. trade measure. I found that among highly prejudiced[2] Americans, cultural distance from trading partners more than doubles opposition to international trade, *independent* of economic considerations.

These results are not surprising. While the theoretical relationship between prejudice and protectionism—and symbolic attitudes and trade opinion, more broadly—is left unexplored and underdeveloped in many studies, theories of heuristic judgment and symbolic politics from political psychology expect the association to be both strong and causal. Indeed, I argue extensively in Chapters 2 and 3 that the symbols associated with trade—it represents a transaction with a "foreign other," for instance—evoke an automatic, affective response based on stable, individual-level predispositions such as generalized prejudice, cosmopolitanism, or nationalism. As research in social psychology indicates, the mind relies on shortcuts wherever possible to avoid the effortful mental work of conscious and deliberate reasoning (Kahneman 2011). In the formation of preferences over trade, these cognitive shortcuts are delivered by individual attitudes toward out-groups, whether positive or negative. The empirical expectation is clear: individual trade preferences will be affected by symbolic predispositions such as prejudice and cosmopolitanism.

In observational studies of trade opinion, where attitudes toward trade *in general* are typically measured, this prediction is straightforwardly reflected in the finding that prejudice and cosmopolitanism are associated with negative and positive trade sentiment, respectively. In the context of certain experimental investigations of trade opinion, how-

[2]Throughout this chapter, the term "prejudiced" is used simply as a label for those who have especially negative attitudes toward out-groups. Clearly, this designation is not intended as an indictment of those individuals' character.

ever, the implication might be somewhat less obvious. Indeed, depending on the study, positive and negative out-group attitudes may not simply have corresponding opposite effects.

For example, in the survey experiment presented in Chapter 2, prejudiced Americans behaved as expected, discriminating against firms that were assumed to be from culturally distant parts of the world. In contrast, Americans on the opposite end of the symbolic attitudinal scale—i.e., those with *positive* out-group attitudes—should *not* exhibit any discriminatory behavior. According to the theory presented briefly above, the cultural proximity or distance of a trading partner should not affect cosmopolitans' support for trade. Unlike the prejudiced, who respond negatively to cultural difference, cosmopolitans are expected to be just as willing to trade with countries that are culturally foreign as those which are culturally familiar. Curiously, however, this is not the pattern I observe. Indeed, as I show in Section 4.5, cultural distance *increases* support for trade among cosmopolitans. Why might this be the case?

4.3 For Whom is Trade Good? Cosmopolitans and Foreign-Regarding Considerations

Conventional political economy models of trade opinion highlight objective material self-interest as the key source of individual trade preferences (Alt et al. 1996). Whether they emphasize an individual's skill level, industry of employment, or some other relevant economic characteristic, these models implicitly assume that members of the public understand the actual implications of trade for their economic interests.

In recent years, however, *subjective* beliefs about the impact of trade have been advanced as sources of public opinion toward trade (Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mansfield and Mutz 2013). First, it has been argued that regardless of trade's objective economic self-impact, subjective beliefs about trade's effect on one's self and family might be significant drivers of trade preferences. Second, and much more prominently, *sociotropic* perceptions—beliefs about how trade affects one's country *as a whole*—have been presented as important sources of attitudes toward international trade. Most notably, Mans-

field and Mutz argue that, like attitudes toward other aspects of economic policy, individual trade preferences are powerfully shaped by the perceived collective consequences of trade policy for the economy of the nation (2009; 2013).

While the causal priority of sociotropic beliefs with respect to trade preferences remains to be established, the introduction of sociotropic influence into the debate is an important and promising conceptual development. But if beliefs about trade's *national*-level impact can shape opinion, might beliefs about the effect of trade on foreigners also play role? To my knowledge, this possibility has yet to receive scholarly attention. On the one hand, it is not surprising that the potential role of foreign-regarding concerns has not been explored in the context of trade opinion. The shift in focus away from material self-interest explanations and toward factors such as symbolic attitudes and sociotropic beliefs is a relatively new—and still controversial (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012)—development in the study of preferences in international political economy. That attitudes toward trade might be shaped by the perceived interests of peoples and countries *beyond* one's borders represents an especially large theoretical leap given the received wisdom and history of the field.

On the other hand, it seems almost intuitive that some subset of the population—those with an especially cosmopolitan worldview, in particular—would be motivated by foreign-regarding concerns. Suggestive evidence of a similar phenomenon already exists in the adjacent issue-area of foreign aid. Milner and Tingley (2013) find, for example, that in a representative survey of Americans, more liberal voters respond more favorably to foreign economic aid when it targets the neediest groups abroad, while more conservative voters are more supportive of aid when it serves the interests of the U.S. economy. Their finding is relevant here, not because cosmopolitans (as I define them) and liberals can be equated, but rather, because it suggests that in certain segments of the American public, concerns about the well-being of foreigners might be driving individual policy preferences.

My contention in this chapter is that beliefs about the impact of trade policy abroad are an important and greatly understudied source of public opinion toward international trade. Specifically, I expect the trade preferences of those who have highly positive

attitudes toward out-groups to be especially susceptible to the effect of foreign-regarding considerations. To examine this claim empirically, I exploit the experimental design presented in Chapter 2 and briefly described in Section 4.2, supplementing the results with a systematic analysis of subjects' open-ended responses. The next section turns again to the design of the study.

4.4 Experimental Design

4.4.1 Overview

To investigate sources of trade preferences across various subsets of the population, I designed a population-based survey experiment (Mutz 2011) that was fielded on a sample of 1,001 Americans from July 13 to July 16, 2013. The GfK Group conducted the survey using the web-enabled KnowledgePanel, a probability-based panel designed to be representative of the U.S. population. Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone numbers and residential addresses. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in the KnowledgePanel. For those who agree to participate, but do not already have internet access, GfK provides at no cost a laptop and ISP connection. People who already have computers and internet service are permitted to participate using their own equipment.

As mentioned above, I take inspiration from Bertrand and Mullainathan's famous resume experiment (2004) to investigate the effect of cultural distance from trading partners on public opinion toward trade. All subjects were informed of a potential policy measure that would ease U.S. trade restrictions and make it easier for some foreign firms to sell their products in the United States. Subjects were then presented with the hypothetical example of one company that would be affected by such a trade measure (i.e., a foreign company for whom it would become easier to export goods into the U.S. as a result of the trade policy under consideration). Finally, respondents were asked to report their level of opposition or support for the potential trade measure before an open-ended question prompted them to explain their expressed trade opinion.

The first experimental manipulation of the study concerns the *name* of the hypothetical foreign firm that was presented to respondents. Subjects were assigned to a firm name that was shown (through prior experimental investigation—see below) to sound either culturally familiar or ambiguously foreign. A second manipulation involved the economic characteristics of the hypothetical firm, specifically, whether the skill level of the company's labor input is high or low. In all treatment conditions, respondents were explicitly informed that the hypothetical foreign firm is from a country that poses no political or security threats to the United States, and that the company respects safety and labor standards. Furthermore, I collect data on respondents' attitudes toward outgroups, enabling me to observe the effect of cultural distance on the trade preferences of cosmopolitans specifically.

4.4.2 Culturally Familiar versus Ambiguously Foreign: The Choice of Firm Names

Clearly, the choice of a culturally foreign and a culturally familiar firm name is central to the success of this study and to the credibility of its findings. Most importantly, in order to avoid the possibility that the results are driven by the cultural, economic, or political characteristics of any one country or part of the world, it is essential that the name used to signal cultural distance is *ambiguously* foreign. That is to say, the chosen name should not be easily or overwhelmingly associated by subjects with a single country or cluster of countries. Rather, what is needed is a name whose believed origin enjoys a relatively even distribution across a reasonably broad range of culturally distant countries and regions.

Given this criterion, I tested the suitability of numerous invented and quasi-invented names through a series of surveys on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Respondents on MTurk were asked: "[*Firm Name*] is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part of the world would you say that [*Firm Name*] is from? Please be as specific as possible and remember that the most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind." Based on responses to this question, I finally identified the name "Tuntyakore & Zideying" as an ideal candidate. The preceding question was also posed at the outset of this survey to those in the culturally foreign treatment group of

the nationally representative sample. Their answers—classified according to the standard United Nations Geographical Region Groupings[3] and represented in Figure 4.1—confirm the suitability of "Tuntyakore & Zideying" as an ambiguously foreign firm name.

Figure 4.1: Tuntyakore & Zideying's Believed Country of Origin.



Note: Figure 4.1 categorizes and presents answers given by respondents to the following question: "Tuntyakore & Zideying is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part of the world would you say that Tuntyakore & Zideying is from? Please be as specific as possible and remember that the most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind." I classified countries and geographic areas according to the standard United Nations Geographical Region Groupings, with three exceptions. First, I collapse the sub-regions identified by the UN classification as Northern, Western, and Southern Europe into the one category commonly known as "Western Europe." Second, because about 50% of the respondents who identified Tuntyakore & Zideying as being from the African continent did so by simply identifying the continent as a whole (i.e., "Africa"), I collapse the UN's African sub-regions into one category. Note that among the remaining 50% of responses that identified the name as African, but did so more specifically by identifying a particular country or sub-region of the continent, no particular area of Africa was overrepresented. In other words, all areas of the continent were represented relatively evenly. Third, I include an additional category called "Asia" to represent the small minority who responded to the question by simply answering "Asia" and not specifying any particular country or region within that continent.

As a company name that signals cultural proximity, I chose "Gordon & Roberts." MTurk respondents identified this name primarily with the United Kingdom, but "Gordon & Roberts" was also strongly associated with Canada and a number of other Western

[3]See United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

European countries. The responses of those in the culturally familiar treatment group of the nationally representative sample, again offered at the outset of this survey and represented in Figure 4.2, largely reflect the MTurk findings.

Figure 4.2: Gordon & Roberts' Believed Country of Origin.



Note: Figure 4.2 categorizes and presents answers given by respondents to the following question: "Gordon & Roberts is the name of a foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) company. Which country or part of the world would you say that Gordon & Roberts is from? Please be as specific as possible and remember that the most accurate responses are usually those that come immediately to mind."

Needless to say, this study relies heavily on the assumption that cultural distance is binary in the context of trade preference formation. While this assumption is unlikely to be accurate, for the purposes of this study, it is both reasonable and highly useful: it enables us to isolate the effect of cultural distance on trade preferences and to investigate the interaction of cultural factors with economic ones.

4.4.3 Stimulus and Manipulation Check

Respondents were presented with the following information and question:

Now consider that the United States is contemplating the removal of trade

> restrictions which would allow some foreign companies to more freely sell their goods in the United States. As a hypothetical example, consider the case of [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*], one such foreign firm. [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] has the following characteristics:
>
> It has about 500 workers.
>
> [*Over 90% of its workers are not college educated, and approximately 60% have not completed high school./Approximately 60% of its workforce has a PhD or other advanced degree, and over 90% of its workforce is university educated.*]
>
> The company respects safety and labor standards, and is based in a country that poses no political or security threats to the United States.
>
> Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow firms such as [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] to more freely sell their goods in the United States?

The two manipulations—the name of the firm (culturally familiar or culturally foreign) and the skill level of its workers (high or low)—yield a 2x2 design with four treatment conditions. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of these four groups.

As explained in Section 4.4.2, respondents were asked to guess the geographic origin of Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts in the survey's opening question. The next question on the survey (still before exposure to the firm-related information and question above) was designed to strengthen the effectiveness[4] of the treatment by asking subjects: "Think for a few moments about the country or part of the world that [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] is from. What language or languages are spoken there? If you're not sure, don't worry—just take a guess." The purpose of this second question is simply to fix in the respondent's mind her original guess, reducing the likelihood that she would change her mind about the firm's country of origin (and potentially, its cultural familiarity or foreignness) upon learning of the firm's other characteristics.

To monitor the latter possibility, I included the following post-treatment manipulation check after measuring the dependent variable: "Did you continue to assume that [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] is from [*respondent's original answer*]?"

[4]I use the term "effective" here to mean that the treatment is effective in producing the intended variation in the independent variable, not that it is effective in altering the dependent variable.

Those who answered "no" were asked where they assumed Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts to be from. Over 80% of respondents maintained their original answer. Those who changed their mind did not do so in a way that significantly altered the original distribution of guesses across different regions of the world. As a result, the changed answers do not lead to a noticeable shift away from the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation.

4.4.4 Measuring Cosmopolitanism

Given my focus in this study on the factors motivating the trade preferences of cosmopolitans, measuring individual attitudes toward out-groups is of central importance. To do so, I rely primarily on an abridged Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) index. SDO scales, used by psychologists to measure racial and ethnic prejudice, offer a number of significant advantages to the study of symbolic attitudes and trade preferences.

The concept of SDO comes from Social Dominance Theory, a social psychological theory based on the idea that "all human societies tend to be structured systems of group-based hierarchies" consisting of "one or a small number of dominant and hegemonic groups at the top and one or a number of subordinate groups at the bottom" (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p. 31). From this theory emerged the individual-level variable called *social dominance orientation*, "the extent to which one desires that one's in-group dominate or be superior to out-groups" (Pratto et al. 1994). As Pratto et al. explain, "We consider SDO to be a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along a superior-inferior dimension" (Pratto et al. 1994, p. 741).

SDO is very strongly and consistently correlated with common measures of out-group attitudes such as racism and nationalism (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Importantly, these correlations hold even when rather different measures of racism and nationalism are used. This reflects one of the great strengths of SDO as a measure of symbolic predispositions in this context, namely, that it has been shown to capture the underlying predisposition (i.e., a generalized preference for group dominance or equality) that drives more specific,

and often culturally-contingent, symbolic attitudes at both ends of the spectrum (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius et al. 1992). In other words, SDO in fact taps the fundamental predisposition *underlying* all the symbolic attitudes which have been found to correlate with trade preferences in various observational studies. In sum, SDO offers what is likely to be the most basic, generalizable—and thus appropriate—measure of relevant symbolic predispositions ("positive" or "negative") in the context of globalization opinion.[5]

Here, I am obviously interested in individuals at the "positive" extreme of the SDO scale—those at the opposite end of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum from the highly prejudiced or extremely nationalistic. After administering the treatment, measuring the dependent variable, checking the manipulation, and collecting additional demographic information, I present respondents with questions from a two-point SDO scale. Specifically, I asked subjects to express their degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements:

"In setting priorities, we must consider all groups."
"We should not push for group equality."

Response options spanned a five-point scale, ranging from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree." To construct a measure of SDO, I first code responses to each of these two statements so that in each case, those favoring (opposing) group equality have lower (higher) scores on a five-point scale. I then average the two scores, yielding a five-point SDO variable. In the analysis that follows, those with an SDO score of "1"—individuals, in other words, who have very positive attitudes toward out-groups—are regarded as "cosmopolitans."

[5]This is also important for the eventual extension of this study and others like it to contexts beyond the United States. As a measure of out-group attitudes that is not specific to any particular content or culture, SDO can serve as a consistent measure of symbolic predispositions across cultures, countries, and contexts. Indeed, a recent study of SDO in 15 languages and 20 countries shows that the measure is highly general and cross-culturally robust (Pratto et al. 2012). The lion's share of scholarship on mass attitudes toward international trade and globalization focuses on the United States, and studies that rigorously examine the role of symbolic predispositions in the formation of trade preferences outside the American context are especially scarce. The use of a generalizable measure such as SDO can help facilitate greater cross-cultural research in this area.

4.4.5 Trade Preferences and Open-Ended Follow-Up

Recall from Section 4.4.3 that the dependent variable in this study (i.e., trade support) is derived from responses to the question below, with response options spanning a five-point scale from "Strongly support" to "Strongly oppose":

> Would you support or oppose removing trade restrictions which would allow firms such as [*Tuntyakore & Zideying/Gordon & Roberts*] to more freely sell their goods in the United States?

One of the innovations of this study is the collection and analysis of open-ended responses to better understand the micro-foundations of trade preferences. Immediately after measuring the dependent variable, I asked all respondents the following open-ended question:

> Think back to how you answered the last question. What considerations or feelings led you to answer in the way that you did? Please be as specific and detailed as possible, writing several sentences. Your thoughts are very important to us. Also, please try to use correct spelling.

The procedure used to code these responses is explained at length in Section 4.6, below. Figure 4.3 outlines the experimental design of the study and maps the order in which respondents were exposed to the relevant stimuli and questions.[6]

Figure 4.3: Map of Experimental Procedure.



[6]To address concerns that the treatment might somehow prime out-group attitudes, a series of unrelated demographic and knowledge questions precede the measurement of symbolic attitudes in this experiment.

4.5 Cosmopolitanism, Cultural Distance, and Trade Preferences: Initial Findings

Does cultural distance from trading partners have an effect on the trade preferences of cosmopolitans? The theoretical framework I summarized in Section 4.2—based on theories of heuristic judgment and symbolic politics—expects *no* discrimination from cosmopolitans on the basis of cultural foreignness or familiarity. In other words, unlike the trade preferences of the prejudiced, the level of trade support expressed by cosmopolitans should not be affected by the hypothetical firm name to which they are exposed.

As I explain at the outset of this chapter, however, this expectation is not met. Cosmopolitans are not indifferent to cultural distance in the context of trade; indeed, they appear to strongly favor cultural foreignness over familiarity. Table 4.1 summarizes the estimated effect of a trading partner's cultural foreignness on support for trade among cosmopolitans, pooling over both economic treatment conditions (i.e., low- and highly skilled workforce).

Table 4.1: The Estimated Effect of Cultural Distance on Support for Trade among Cosmopolitans, Pooling over Economic Treatment Conditions.

	Level of Trade Support among Cosmopolitans
Culturally Foreign Treatment	81.8
Culturally Familiar Treatment	65.6
Difference 95% Confidence Interval	16.2 (1.6 to 30.8)
p-value	0.030

Note: The table presents the percentage of cosmopolitan respondents who supported easing trade restrictions when the affected non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign and when it was culturally familiar, pooling over the two economic treatment conditions. The difference is the estimated effect of cultural distance on trade support, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. The sample sizes for the analysis were 77 for the Culturally Foreign Treatment and 61 for the Culturally Familiar Treatment.

The table shows the percentage of cosmopolitan respondents who supported easing trade restrictions when the affected (hypothetical) non-U.S. firm was culturally foreign and when it was culturally familiar. The results reveal that cultural foreignness has a significant effect on support for trade in this subgroup. Approximately 81.8% of cosmopolitans supported the easing of trade restrictions when the non-U.S. firm was cultur-

ally foreign, versus 65.6% when the hypothetical firm was culturally familiar (p=0.030). Cultural distance thus leads to a more than 25% increase in support for trade among those with highly positive attitudes toward out-groups.[7]

What accounts for this result? One possibility is that the theory I advance has different implications than those I anticipate. Specifically, it might be the case that positive symbolic attitudes lead individuals to a form of *reverse* discrimination: rather than being indifferent to cultural distance, cosmopolitans have a more positive affective response to trade when the trading partner is more culturally foreign. In the context of the current experiment, this would imply greater levels of support under the culturally foreign treatment, exactly as we observe. Under this interpretation, furthermore, the effect of cultural distance should not depend on the skill level of the firm's workers. In other words, since cultural distance is driving the increase in trade support via an emotional gut reaction, conditioning the analysis on the skill level of the hypothetical firm's labor input should yield similar results. Indeed, as Chapter 2 reports, cultural distance significantly increases opposition to trade among the prejudiced regardless of the hypothetical workforce's skill level, whether high or low.

Another possibility is that the observed difference in trade support is due to foreign-regarding considerations. If respondents associate cultural distance with poorer economic conditions in general, they may feel more supportive of firms or workers who produce goods in culturally distant parts of the world. Put differently, individuals with a cosmopolitan worldview might be motivated to support trade out of a desire to help those in (perceived) economic need, resulting in greater trade support when need is perceived to be higher. Here, the effect of cultural distance may very well depend on the skill level of the hypothetical firm's workforce. If cosmopolitans are motivated by the desire to assist those who are economically needy, low-skilled workers in culturally foreign parts of the world will represent more compelling candidates for help than their highly skilled counterparts, who might enjoy greater economic opportunities and a higher standard of

[7]The results reported in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 (below) are robust to the exclusion of respondents whose beliefs about the country origin of Tuntyakore & Zideying cluster around any one geographic sub-region. In other words, the results remain virtually unchanged when any one part of the world (e.g., Africa, Southern Asian, etc.) is excluded from the analysis.

living.

Table 4.2 presents the estimated effect of cultural distance on support for trade among cosmopolitans, this time conditioning the analysis on the skill level of the hypothetical firm's labor input. Once again, I present the percentage of cosmopolitan respondents who supported easing trade restrictions in each treatment group. Among those who received the "Low-Skilled" treatment (Column 1), the impact of cultural distance is strong: support for trade rose sharply from 57.9% of cosmopolitans when the hypothetical firm was cultural familiar, to 88.1% when the firm was culturally foreign. Cultural distance thus increased support for trade in this subgroup by more than 52%. This represents a rise of more than 30 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval of 11.5 to 48.9. Clearly, this effect is highly significant both statistically and substantively. In sharp contrast, among cosmopolitans who received the "Highly Skilled" economic treatment (Column 2), the effect of cultural distance on trade preferences is not statistically different than zero.

Table 4.2: The Estimated Effect of Cultural Distance on Support for Trade among Cosmopolitans, Conditioning on the Skill Level of the Hypothetical Firm's Workforce.

	Level of Trade Support among Cosmopolitans	
	(1) Low-Skilled Workforce Treatment	(2) Highly Skilled Workforce Treatment
Culturally Foreign Treatment	81.8	74.3
Culturally Familiar Treatment	57.9	78.3
Difference 95% Confidence Interval	30.2 (11.5 to 48.9)	4.0 (-27.4 to 19.4)
p-value	0.002	0.735

Note: The table presents the percentage of respondents who supported easing trade restrictions in each treatment group. The difference is the estimated effect of cultural distance conditional on economic treatment, with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. The sample sizes for the analysis presented in the first column were 42 for the Culturally Foreign Treatment and 38 for the Culturally Familiar Treatment. The corresponding sample sizes for the analysis presented in the second column were 35 and 23.

The results presented in Table 4.2 are very telling. First, they rule out the possibility that cosmopolitanism leads to reverse discrimination on the basis of cultural factors

alone. Second, they offer preliminary support for the hypothesis that foreign-regarding considerations play a role in the formation of trade preferences among cosmopolitans. That the impact of cultural distance on trade support depends on the Low-Skilled treatment suggests that cosmopolitan support for trade is motivated by a desire to help the most economically needy. Where poorly skilled workers are concerned, it appears that trading with parts of the world that are associated with relatively poor economic conditions and fewer opportunities is much more attractive to cosmopolitans than is trade with culturally similar countries. The broader implication for our understanding of trade preferences is significant: these findings suggest that in some subset of the population, trade preferences are shaped by considerations that are strictly *foreign*-regarding. To investigate this proposition further, I turn next to an analysis of the open-ended responses provided by subjects.

4.6 Trade as Aid: Evidence of Foreign-Regarding Concerns as Sources of Trade Preferences

Although the use of surveys and survey experiments is very common in political science research (and becoming increasingly more common in the study of international political economy), the analysis of open-ended responses remains extremely unusual (Roberts et al. 2014). Open-ended questions have rarely been used in the experimental study of any political science topic,[8] and to my knowledge, they have never been used in survey-based studies of globalization opinion, whether experimental or otherwise. Despite its possible drawbacks (the possibility of post-hoc justification in subjects' responses to open-ended follow-up questions, for example), the analysis of open-ended responses presents a potentially powerful new tool for the investigation of individual preferences over economic globalization.

Recall that in this study, after expressing her level of support or opposition to the easing of trade restrictions on a five-point scale, each subject was asked to explain the reasons for her expressed trade preference. To further unpack the micro-foundations

[8]Two exceptions are Tomz 2007 and Gadarian and Albertson 2014.

of preferences toward trade, I systematically analyze these open-ended explanations. I am especially interested in observing whether (as anticipated above) foreign-regarding justifications of trade opinion are significantly more prevalent among cosmopolitans in the Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment group than in the Culturally Foreign/Highly Skilled treatment group. Although such a finding would neither establish the causal impact of foreign-regarding considerations on trade preferences nor conclusively explain the difference in cosmopolitan support across the aforementioned treatment groups, it would provide, for the first time, very strong suggestive evidence that foreign-regarding concerns are important sources of public opinion toward trade in a sizeable subset of the population.

Of the 1,001 respondents in the sample, approximately 60% either misunderstood the open-ended question, did not provide an answer, or gave a response that was otherwise unclear or unclassifiable.[9] Of those who did provide a classifiable answer, responses fell into five categories. The first category includes reasons that were described earlier in this chapter as "sociotropic" considerations. These are responses that expressed only a concern for the interests of the United States as a whole. Most of these concerns were economic in nature (U.S. jobs gained or lost, cost of products to U.S. consumers, etc.), but some respondents offered security-related considerations as well. The second category includes individuals who offered exclusively foreign-regarding concerns, with the majority expressing a desire to help improve the economic well-being of foreign workers. Those who expressed *both* sociotropic and foreign-regarding considerations—explaining that the proposed trade policy would either help or harm both Americans and foreigners—fell into the third category.

The fourth category reflects reasoning based in abstract economic principles. These respondents, who overwhelmingly favored trade, referenced economic concepts such as comparative advantage (whether implicitly or explicitly), or made statements such as, "All trade is always good for everyone." Finally, the fifth category includes individuals who articulated a relatively narrow range of other considerations. These include abstract

[9]This proportion is roughly equal across treatment groups and across SDO-based subgroups.

principles of fairness and reciprocity between countries ("If they allow our exports, then we should accept theirs."), a belief in the competence of the hypothetical company, a perception that the hypothetical company adheres to norms shared by U.S. firms, or more rarely, expressions of self-interest.

A research assistant and I separately read and coded the reason(s) offered by each subject for his expressed trade opinion, classifying each response into one of the five categories just described. When a discrepancy arose between my classification and that of the other coder (this occurred in less than 10% of cases), I made the final coding decision. All coding was obviously done blindly, without knowledge of the respondents' expressed trade preferences or of their cosmopolitan status.[10]

The results are highly supportive of the proposition that the trade preferences of cosmopolitans are susceptible to the effect of foreign-regarding considerations. Table 4.3 presents the percentage of all cosmopolitans in each treatment group who fall into each of the five response categories. Among cosmopolitans who received the Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment, 55.6% justify their trade opinion by appealing *exclusively* to the interests of foreigners, compared to only 11.1% percent in the Culturally Familiar/Low-Skilled treatment group ($p < 0.001$).

Table 4.4 focuses only on cosmopolitans who support trade, showing the percentage of trade-supporting cosmopolitans in each treatment group who fall into each of the five classifications. As we would expect, the relevant differences in preference justification here are wider. Over 65% of trade-supporting cosmopolitans in the Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment group justify their support for trade by appealing exclusively to foreign-regarding considerations, versus just 7.1% percent in the Culturally Familiar/Low-Skilled treatment group (p=0.005). In the latter group, where cosmopolitan support for trade was significantly lower, sociotropic concerns are by far the most common justification

[10]I chose to hand-code the open-ended responses in this study because I wanted to become as directly familiar as possible with the collected data. However, my analysis of these open-ended responses might benefit considerably from use of the structural topic model presented in Roberts et al. 2014 for the semi-automated analysis survey responses. The latter approach classifies and analyzes open-ended responses while incorporating information that is particular to each respondent (e.g., symbolic attitudes, treatment group, etc.) and making it possible to use the analysis of the open-ended textual data to estimate treatment effects.

Table 4.3: Reasons Offered by All Cosmopolitans for Their Expressed Trade Preference.

	Reason Offered for Expressed Trade Preference				
Treatment Group	(1) U.S. Interests Only	(2) Foreign-Regarding Concerns Only	(3) Both U.S. Interests and Foreign-Regarding	(4) Economic Principles	(5) Other
Culturally Foreign/ Low-Skilled	14.8%	55.6%	18.5%	3.7%	7.4%
Culturally Familiar/ Low-Skilled	63.0%	11.1%	7.4%	7.4%	11.1%
Culturally Foreign/ Highly Skilled	56.5%	8.7%	0.0%	0.0%	34.8%
Culturally Familiar/ Highly Skilled	62.5%	6.25%	6.25%	6.25%	18.8%

Note: The table presents the percentage of all cosmopolitans in each treatment group who provided a classifiable open-ended response and justified their expressed trade opinion by appealing to (1) U.S. interests, (2) foreign-regarding concerns, (3) both U.S. interests and foreign-regarding concerns, (4) economic principles, or (5) other considerations. Due to rounding, some rows do not add up to exactly 100%. The sample size for this analysis is 93.

provided for both support and opposition to trade.

Overwhelmingly, the foreign-regarding reasons offered by trade-supporting cosmopolitans who received the Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment reflect the desire to provide help to those who need it most. A typical response reads, "We are one world, and we should encourage enterprise, particularly in disadvantaged countries, in order to provide sustenance to all. The 500 employees sound like people who need a leg up." Another respondent explains her support for trade by writing, "So that these not-so-educated workers can continue to be hired, So a poorer country than the US has a chance to compete in the world."

When responses that fall into Category 3 are also considered (i.e., when *any* mention of foreign-regarding concerns is included in the analysis), 87% of trade-supporting cosmopolitans appeal to foreign-regarding considerations in the Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment group, versus 21.4% in the Culturally Familiar/Low-Skilled treatment group, 15.3% in the Culturally Foreign/Highly Skilled group, and 16.6% in the Culturally

Familiar/Highly Skilled group.

Table 4.4: Reasons Offered by Trade-Supporting Cosmopolitans for Their Expressed Support.

	Reason Offered for Trade Support				
Treatment Group	(1) U.S. Interests Only	(2) Foreign-Regarding Concerns Only	(3) Both U.S. Interests and Foreign-Regarding	(4) Economic Principles	(5) Other
Culturally Foreign/ Low-Skilled	8.7%	65.2%	21.7%	4.4%	0.0%
Culturally Familiar/ Low-Skilled	50.0%	7.1%	14.3%	7.1%	7.1%
Culturally Foreign/ Highly Skilled	46.2%	15.3%	0.0%	0.0%	38.5%
Culturally Familiar/ Highly Skilled	50.0%	8.3%	8.3%	8.3%	25.0%

Note: The table presents the percentage of all trade-supporting cosmopolitans in each treatment group who provided a classifiable open-ended response and justified their expressed support by appealing to (1) U.S. interests, (2) foreign-regarding concerns, (3) both U.S. interests and foreign-regarding concerns, (4) economic principles, or (5) other considerations. Due to rounding, some rows do not add up to exactly 100%. The sample size for this analysis is 62.

For comparative purposes, Tables 4.5 and 4.6 presents corresponding figures for non-cosmopolitans in the sample. Here, foreign-regarding justifications are not especially prominent in any group.

The results presented in this section suggest that the conditional effect of cultural distance on cosmopolitan support for trade is largely driven by a concern for the interests of people *abroad*. More generally, the results provide the first evidence that foreign-regarding considerations exist as sources of trade opinion, and that the trade preferences of individuals with a particularly cosmopolitan worldview—that is, those with very positive attitudes toward out-groups—are especially susceptible to the effect of such foreign-regarding concerns.

Table 4.5: Reasons Offered by All Non-Cosmopolitans for Their Expressed Trade Preference.

	Reason Offered for Expressed Trade Preference				
Treatment Group	(1) U.S. Interests Only	(2) Foreign-Regarding Concerns Only	(3) Both U.S. Interests and Foreign-Regarding	(4) Economic Principles	(5) Other
Culturally Foreign/ Low-Skilled	54.6%	7.6%	7.6%	9.2%	21.0%
Culturally Familiar/ Low-Skilled	57.8%	5.9%	1.5%	11.1%	23.7%
Culturally Foreign/ Highly Skilled	52.5%	1.9%	5.8%	10.7%	29.1%
Culturally Familiar/ Highly Skilled	66.2%	0.8%	0.8%	5.3%	27.1%

Note: The table presents the percentage of all non-cosmopolitans in each treatment group who provided a classifiable open-ended response and justified their expressed trade opinion by appealing to (1) U.S. interests, (2) foreign-regarding concerns, (3) both U.S. interests and foreign-regarding concerns, (4) economic principles, or (5) other considerations. Due to rounding, some rows do not add up to exactly 100%. The sample size for this analysis is 490.

Table 4.6: Reasons Offered by Trade-Supporting Non-Cosmopolitans for Their Expressed Support.

	Reason Offered for Expressed Trade Preference				
Treatment Group	(1) U.S. Interests Only	(2) Foreign-Regarding Concerns Only	(3) Both U.S. Interests and Foreign-Regarding	(4) Economic Principles	(5) Other
Culturally Foreign/ Low-Skilled	35.1%	9.5%	12.2%	14.9%	28.4%
Culturally Familiar/ Low-Skilled	48.4%	8.4%	2.1%	14.7%	26.3%
Culturally Foreign/ Highly Skilled	34.9%	3.2%	9.5%	17.5%	34.9%
Culturally Familiar/ Highly Skilled	55.9%	1.1%	1.1%	7.5%	34.4%

Note: The table presents the percentage of all trade-supporting non-cosmopolitans in each treatment group who provided a classifiable open-ended response and justified their expressed support by appealing to (1) U.S. interests, (2) foreign-regarding concerns, (3) both U.S. interests and foreign-regarding concerns, (4) economic principles, or (5) other considerations. Due to rounding, some rows do not add up to exactly 100%. The sample size for this analysis is 325.

4.7 Some Potential Objections and Robustness Checks

Admittedly, the findings of this chapter are suggestive rather than conclusive. Indeed, further study is needed to solidify the conclusions that I draw. For example, an experiment that explicitly manipulates the information that respondents receive about the consequences of trade for foreigners would offer a more direct test of the causal effect of foreign-regarding considerations on trade opinion. However, to the extent that my findings provide evidence of foreign-regarding motivations, they withstand a variety of objections and robustness checks.

First, readers might object that one of the central claims of this chapter is tautological. Is it trivial to argue that individuals with very positive attitudes toward out-groups are motivated by foreign-regarding concerns in the context of trade? Certainly, this claim is an intuitive one. But I would argue that it is neither obvious nor uninteresting. Notice that the argument I make is not simply that cosmopolitans care more about the well-being of foreigners in general, but rather, that (a) they do so in a very particular context (i.e., trade politics), and (b) that this concern has a significant impact on their policy preferences. The evidence I have presented suggests that, under certain conditions, the well-being of foreigners is easily the most prevalent consideration shaping trade opinion among cosmopolitans. This particular result is not at all obvious *a priori*.

Second, readers might worry that the main result presented in Section 4.5 (i.e., the increase in cosmopolitan trade support that results from cultural distance when low-skilled workers are concerned) is driven—not by foreign-regarding considerations, as the open-ended responses indicate—but by material self-interest. One might argue, in other words, that if cosmopolitans are also among the highest skilled in society, they may be less open to high-skill-intensive imports since these present the greatest threat to their personal economic interests. None of the results presented in this chapter hold, however, if skill level (proxied by education) is used instead of the SDO-based measure of symbolic attitudes. Furthermore, it is clearly not the case that cosmopolitans favor low-skill-intensive imports in general. In fact, of the four treatment conditions, cosmopolitan

trade support is at its lowest in the Culturally Familiar/Low-Skilled group, potentially reflecting a desire to protect low-skilled workers at home over low-skilled workers in another country that is (perceived to be) just as well off as the United States.

Another potential objection might stem from concerns that the open-ended responses I analyze in this study are products of post-hoc rationalization, and therefore unreliable indicators of what motivates trade opinion. While this is certainly a possibility, the fact that the vast majority of trade-supporting cosmopolitans in the Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled group provide the *same* justification for their support alleviates this concern: it is unlikely that so many respondents would rationalize in the same way.

Finally, the main results of the chapter largely hold when a different measure of cosmopolitanism is used. As an alternative gauge of attitudes toward out-groups, I rely on a commonly used measure of chauvinistic nationalism. Subjects in the survey experiment were asked to express the degree of their agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "In the United States, our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others." Response options spanned a five-point scale, ranging from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree." For the purposes of this analysis, I consider those who disagree with this statement as cosmopolitans.

While the results are weaker when the nationalism measure is used, they are consistent with the findings shown earlier. Among cosmopolitans who received the Low-Skilled treatment, cultural distance leads to a 19% increase in the level of trade support, from about 69% to 82% (p=0.094). Again, when the analysis is conditioned on the Highly Skilled treatment, cultural distance has no effect on the trade preferences of cosmopolitans. The analysis of open-ended responses using the nationalism measure also yields results similar to those presented earlier: 42% of trade-supporting cosmopolitans in the Culturally Foreign/Low-Skilled treatment group offer exclusively foreign-regarding reasons to justify their support for trade, versus 12% in the Culturally Familiar/Low-Skilled group (p=0.022).

4.8 Conclusions and Implications

Can beliefs about trade's impact abroad shape public opinion toward international trade at home? I have argued in this chapter that they can. My study suggests that among individuals with highly positive attitudes toward out-groups, foreign-regarding considerations are a potentially powerful source of trade preferences. Even if preliminary and suggestive, this finding has significant implications. Most importantly, it reveals a new and uncharted factor in the study of public opinion toward economic globalization. While subjective beliefs about the impact of trade on self and country have recently received attention as sources of trade opinion, the possibility of foreign-regarding considerations has gone wholly unnoticed. This study exposes a very promising area for future research.

Evidence of foreign-regarding motivations also has significant implications for the public politics of trade. If a sizeable portion of Americans (cosmopolitans consistently represent 15%-30% of the population) can be motivated by a concern for foreigners in the context of trade, trade-related elite messages may benefit from reference to foreign-regarding considerations. While appealing to the interests of the neediest foreigners will very likely not play well in the general population (we seldom, if ever, see such appeals in the mainstream discourse on trade in the United States), in messages *targeted* to the more globally-minded, the interests of foreigners may well be powerful movers of public opinion.

The results of this study also raise some interesting questions about the politics of trade more broadly: How does the particular political cleavage highlighted in this chapter affect the current discourse and practice of trade politics? All things being equal, are we more likely to sign trade agreements with countries that need our help most? These questions highlight important avenues for future research.[11]

More generally, this chapter makes two further contributions to the study of public opinion in international political economy. First, it presents analysis of open-ended survey responses in this area, highlighting a powerful new means for the investigation

[11]I am grateful to Dustin Tingley for this point.

of individual preferences over globalization. Second, it focuses especially on the preferences of those on the cosmopolitan end of the symbolic attitudinal spectrum. The role of symbolic attitudes in the formation of trade preferences is not identical at both ends of that spectrum. Delving more deeply into the micro-foundations of cosmopolitan trade support has uncovered important findings.

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Appendix A

Figure 1A: Tuntyakore & Zideying's Believed Country of Origin, Post-Treatment.



Note: Figure 1A classifies and presents respondents' post-treatment beliefs about the geographic origin of the hypothetical foreign firm, Tuntyakore & Zideying. Numbers represent the percentage of respondents who identify the firm with the given category. I classified the countries and geographic areas given by respondents according to the standard United Nations Geographical Region Groupings, with three exceptions. First, I collapse the sub-regions identified by the UN classification as Northern, Western, and Southern Europe into the one category commonly known as "Western Europe." Second, because about 50% of the respondents who identified Tuntyakore & Zideying as being from the African continent did so by simply identifying the continent as a whole (i.e., "Africa"), I collapse the UN's African sub-regions into one category. Note that among the remaining 50% of responses that identified the name as African, but did so more specifically by identifying a particular country or sub-region of the continent, no particular area of Africa was overrepresented. In other words, all areas of the continent were represented relatively evenly. Third, I include an additional category called "Asia" to represent the small minority who responded to the question by simply answering "Asia" and not specifying any particular country or region within that continent.

Figure 2A: Gordon & Roberts' Believed Country of Origin, Post-Treatment.



Note: : Figure 2A classifies and presents respondents' post-treatment beliefs about the geographic origin of the hypothetical foreign firm, Gordon & Roberts. Numbers represent the percentage of respondents who identify the firm with the given category.

Appendix B

Table 1B: Whole Sample Analysis.

VARIABLES	(1) DV=Bad Self-Impact	(2) DV=Bad US Impact	(3) DV=Tariff Support
Age	0.009*	0.003	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Education	-0.177**	-0.169**	-0.062*
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Income	-0.047**	-0.062**	-0.016
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Female	0.544**	0.589**	-0.085
	(0.097)	(0.091)	(0.079)
White	-0.041	0.307+	0.059
	(0.171)	(0.177)	(0.135)
Black	-0.439+	-0.284	-0.506*
	(0.265)	(0.264)	(0.213)
Hispanic	-0.360	-0.088	-0.434+
	(0.301)	(0.293)	(0.234)
Union Member	0.279*	0.378**	0.123
	(0.126)	(0.119)	(0.106)
Democrat	0.031	0.308+	0.316*
	(0.177)	(0.169)	(0.144)
Republican	0.279+	-0.175	-0.077
	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.140)
Independent	-0.152	-0.170	0.179
	(0.170)	(0.166)	(0.139)
Economic Knowledge	-0.179+	-0.218*	-0.226**
	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.076)
Import Industry	0.276**	0.162	0.327**
	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.083)
Cultural Sentiment	0.571**	0.660**	0.191**
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.048)
Constant	-1.770**	-1.743**	-0.605*
	(0.353)	(0.345)	(0.286)
N	3,738	3,741	3,743

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 2B: Split Sample Analysis, DV=*Bad Self Impact*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	DV=Bad Self-Impact	DV=Bad US Impact	DV=Tariff Support
Age	0.014*	0.005	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009))
Education	-0.162**	-0.188**	-0.166*
	(0.056)	(0.065)	(0.068)
Income	-0.068**	0.005	-0.087**
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.033)
Female	0.301+	0.510**	1.043**
	(0.157)	(0.172)	(0.188)
White	0.110	-0.366	0.189
	(0.296)	(0.286)	(0.318)
Black	0.422	-1.627**	-0.217
	(0.391)	(0.476)	(0.599)
Hispanic	-0.075	-0.684	-0.449
	(0.446)	(0.534)	(0.721)
Union Member	0.367+	0.444*	-0.042
	(0.191)	(0.222)	(0.269)
Democrat	0.094	0.170	-0.132
	(0.305)	(0.311)	(0.376)
Republican	-0.340	-0.376	-0.247
	(0.329)	(0.283)	(0.282)
Independent	0.038	-0.206	-0.393
	(0.309)	(0.289)	(0.305)
Economic Knowledge	-0.142	-0.228	-0.187
	(0.158)	(0.176)	(0.192)
Import Industry	0.234	0.607**	-0.099
	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.197)
Constant	-1.497**	-0.534	0.284
	(0.553)	(0.570)	(0.649)
N	1,995	1,040	703

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 3B: Split Sample Analysis, DV=*Bad US Impact.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	DV=Bad Self-Impact	DV=Bad US Impact	DV=Tariff Support
Age	0.006	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Education	-0.164**	-0.175**	-0.164*
	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.066)
Income	-0.088**	-0.010	-0.089**
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Female	0.450**	0.613**	0.897**
	(0.141)	(0.164)	(0.185)
White	0.481	-0.093	0.618+
	(0.317)	(0.294)	(0.317)
Black	0.548	-1.469**	0.071
	(0.402)	(0.449)	(0.607)
Hispanic	0.317	-0.767	0.008
	(0.434)	(0.546)	(0.680)
Union Member	0.413*	0.451*	0.306
	(0.178)	(0.214)	(0.259)
Democrat	0.450	0.477	0.200
	(0.312)	(0.301)	(0.363)
Republican	0.006	-0.266	-0.258
	(0.330)	(0.276)	(0.271)
Independent	0.079	-0.146	-0.479+
	(0.321)	(0.286)	(0.289)
Economic Knowledge	-0.157	-0.245	-0.286
	(0.148)	(0.171)	(0.184)
Import Industry	0.067	0.538**	-0.190
	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.194)
Constant	-1.344*	-0.444	0.561
	(0.540)	(0.568)	(0.647)
N	1,994	1,044	703

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 4B: Split Sample Analysis, DV= *Tariff Support*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	DV=Bad Self-Impact	DV=Bad US Impact	DV=Tariff Support
Age	-0.001	0.003	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Education	-0.089*	-0.094+	0.025
	(0.040)	(0.054)	(0.061)
Income	-0.009	-0.031	-0.014
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.031)
Female	-0.080	-0.070	-0.106
	(0.111)	(0.150)	(0.181)
White	0.241	-0.352	0.161
	(0.199)	(0.254)	(0.279)
Black	-0.032	-1.222**	-0.581
	(0.297)	(0.390)	(0.578)
Hispanic	-0.262	-1.074*	0.184
	(0.311)	(0.488)	(0.582)
Union Member	0.265+	-0.125	0.070
	(0.145)	(0.211)	(0.234)
Democrat	0.594**	0.771**	-0.666+
	(0.226)	(0.295)	(0.351)
Republican	0.251	0.361	-0.921**
	(0.236)	(0.269)	(0.269)
Independent	0.424+	0.634*	-0.590*
	(0.229)	(0.273)	(0.281)
Economic Knowledge	-0.193+	-0.291+	-0.185
	(0.106)	(0.149)	(0.173)
Import Industry	0.223+	0.516**	0.284
	(0.120)	(0.155)	(0.182)
Constant	-0.734+	-0.103	0.310
	(0.389)	(0.524)	(0.603)
N	1,995	1,044	704

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table 5B: Interaction Analysis.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	DV=Bad Self-Impact	DV=Bad US Impact	DV=Tariff Support
Age	0.013**	0.008*	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Education	-0.240**	-0.244**	-0.087**
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Income	-0.048**	-0.063**	-0.017
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Female	0.501**	0.534**	-0.092
	(0.096)	(0.090)	(0.079)
White	-0.079	0.251	0.045
	(0.166)	(0.173)	(0.135)
Black	-0.394	-0.216	-0.483*
	(0.260)	(0.256)	(0.213)
Hispanic	-0.468	-0.220	-0.470*
	(0.297)	(0.286)	(0.234)
Union Member	0.274*	0.365**	0.124
	(0.124)	(0.116)	(0.106)
Democrat	-0.258	-0.047	0.218
	(0.171)	(0.164)	(0.144)
Republican	-0.249	-0.146	-0.066
	(0.164)	(0.159)	(0.140)
Independent	-0.275+	-0.318+	0.137
	(0.167)	(0.164)	(0.141)
Economic Knowledge	-0.218*	-0.257**	-0.237**
	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.076)
Neutral Sentiment	0.045	-0.008	-0.064
	(0.113)	(0.107)	(0.090)
Import Industry	0.119	0.002	0.250*
	(0.125)	(0.120)	(0.098)
ImportIndustry*	0.470*	0.500*	0.267
NeutralSentiment	(0.208)	(0.204)	(0.177)
Constant	-0.557+	-0.301	-0.169
	(0.322)	(0.316)	(0.272)
N	3,738	3,741	3,743

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1